Taxi Driver Online

I haven't even read this case but I'm sure it has an interest to someone? My personal reason for posting this case is because it caught my eye that in 1988 this particular taxi radio company had 100 Taxi owner shareholders and at this moment in time it has 371 shareholders who run 390 cabs between them.

That's nearly a 300 percent increase in twenty years and in my opinion amounts to substantial growth. In fact the increase works out at practically 15% year on year. Funny how this outfit recently told Edinburgh City Council that growth has been stagnant in the last two years but failed to inform CEC that growth had exceeded all expectations in the last twenty years.

It's a pity Jacob's Consulting didn't avail itself of the offer to study documented evidence of Central's worksheets back in 2005?

Anyway this case was brought by an aggrieved party who had his membership terminated by Central cabs and sought legal redress through the courts.
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MALCOLM DEWAR TAIT v CENTRAL RADIO TAXIS (TOLLCROSS) LIMITED

COURT OF SESSION:INNER HOUSE (FIRST DIVISION)

(1988) Inner House Cases

21 October 1988

CATCHWORDS: Administrative Law -- natural justice -- association of taxi drivers and operators -- customer complaint of abusive conduct -- disciplinary committee hearing -- reference to previous disciplinary record assisting committee in accepting present complaint -- no opportunity for pursuer to comment on or correct notes of previous proceedings -- whether opportunity afforded for injustice to be done

COUNSEL: Alt: Cameron QC and Smith Drummond; Alt: McDonald QC and Munday MacLachlan

PANEL:
Lord President (Emslie)

JUDGMENTS: LORD PRESIDENT (EMSLIE): This is an action of damages brought by the pursuer who was in certain circumstances deprived of his membership of the defenders' company. His ground of action was that, in the first place, the termination of his membership was ultra vires of the Company and, in the second place that, in the course of hearings before the defenders' Discipline Committee, these Committees in recommending the termination of his membership acted in breach of the rules of natural justice. After proof the Lord Ordinary assoilzied the defenders and, in this reclaiming motion, the pursuer has challenged his decision on a relatively narrow front.

The pursuer is a taxi driver entitled to ply for hire in the street. He was also, before 23 June 1982, one of the 100 members of a company, the defenders (all of whom were taxi drivers or operators) which supplied radio transceivers to each member in order that a member could, when available and in a convenient location, be directed to pick up a customer of the company who had ordered a taxi by telephone.

Amongst the Company's rules was rule 3.7 which was in the following terms -- "Members shall at no time whether on duty or not conduct themselves in a manner detrimental to the character, reputation or dignity of the Company". Certain provisions were made by the Company to deal with complaints of conduct which might constitute breach of rule 3.7 and, in particular with complaints by customers about a driver's conduct. The provisions were these --

1. There was a Discipline Committee consisting of its convener, and three of the seven members of the defenders' council. The function of the convener was to satisfy himself, if a complaint by a customer was made, that it appeared to be serious enough to warrant consideration by the Discipline Committee and, if he was so satisfied to convene a meeting of the Discipline Committee which the driver in question would be invited to attend. In such a case the practice was for the convener to inform the driver of the general nature of the complaint which had been made against him. At a hearing of the Discipline Committee in the presence of the driver concerned the convener confined himself to reporting to the Committee the details of the complaint which he had obtained from the customer, leaving it to the three members of the Committee, after hearing and questioning the driver, to make up their minds whether or not to accept that the complaint was probably well-founded and where appropriate to decide what action should be taken against the driver. The convener's function, accordingly, was confined to placing before the Committee information in his possession which was relevant for consideration by the three members.

2. There was also an Appeal Committee. Details of its composition need not be mentioned for the purposes of this reclaiming motion. Suffice it to say that a member aggrieved by a decision of the Discipline Committee had a right of appeal against that decision to the Appeal Committee.

It is common ground that a Mrs Aktar, who lived in Wester Hailes, telephoned to the defenders asking them to send a taxi to take her to a Health Centre in order to keep an appointment there. A call to find a driver able to collect Mrs Aktar was broadcast by radio. The pursuer, who was in the Haymarket area, accepted the call and because of the distance which he had to travel, arrived at Mrs Aktar's address later than she had expected. She was accompanied by young children and was very concerned lest she missed her appointment. In the event, the pursuer conveyed her and the children to her destination.

Later that day, Mrs Aktar, by telephone, complained to the defenders about the pursuer's conduct, alleging that he had been abusive to her. The defenders' telephonist reported the complaint to Mr Ford, the convener of the Discipline Committee. Mr Ford then spoke to Mrs Aktar by telephone and obtained from her a more detailed account of her complaint. He then decided that the complaint appeared to be serious enough to go before the Discipline Committee and informed the pursuer in general terms of the gravamen thereof, namely that it was alleged that the pursuer had made abusive remarks to Mrs Aktar about her race, accompanied by swear words. The pursuer was also given notice of the hearing by the Discipline Committee which he duly attended.

In addition to Mr Ford the three members of the Company who constituted the Discipline Committee when the hearing opened were Mr Mellors, Mr Clark and Mr Robb. In accordance with normal practice Mr Ford, the convener, gave to the Committee the details of the complaint by Mrs Aktar which he had obtained from her. The pursuer was then invited to respond to the complaint and he began to do so. At this point, and we shall return to it later, Mr Clark decided to withdraw from the hearing and did so. Another member of the Council of the defenders happened to be in the building and was called in to take Mr Clark's place. The proceedings of the Discipline Committee then began again. In particular, Mr Ford repeated his information about the complaint and the pursuer was given an opportunity to way what he had to say about it and was questioned by the members of the Committee. The Committee then retired with the convener to consider their decision. Their decision was, and this was intimated to the pursuer, that the pursuer should be requested to resign his membership from the Company or be barred from membership. The pursuer was informed that he had forty-eight hours within which to challenge that decision on appeal. For various reasons which we need not explore the pursuer failed to appear before the Appeal Committee at the hearing of which he had notice. The appeal was dealt with in his absence and the decision of the Discipline Committee was affirmed. By letter dated 23 June, the defenders wrote to the pursuer in the following terms -- "I have been instructed to inform you that an Appeals Committee was convened at 13.15 hours on 23rd June, 1982 to hear and discuss your Appeal against the Disciplinary Committee's findings on 21st June, 1982. Since you failed to appear the Appeals Committee dealt with the case, the Company Procedure allowing them to do so in your absence. The Appeals Committee upheld the findings of the Disciplinary Committee. I have therefore to inform you as from 1400 hours on 23rd June, 1982 your membership of CRT is terminated." When he received this letter the pursuer was asked to hand over his radio and this he did.

Following a debate in procedure roll the action went to proof before answer. The pursuer failed to satisfy the Lord Ordinary that the termination of his membership was ultra vires of the defenders and since the pursuer accepts the Lord Ordinary's disposal of that part of his case we need say no more about it. The other branch of his case as pled against the defenders rested upon the proposition that in the proceedings before the Discipline Committee and perhaps also the Appeals Committee there had been a failure to observe the requirements of natural justice. So far as the proceedings before the Discipline Committee were concerned the pursuer appeared on Record to have three particular criticisms. The first was that there was no evidence before the Discipline Committee upon which a reasonable tribunal, properly directed, could hold the complaint proved. In his own proof this proposition emerged as a contention that there was a denial of natural justice in respect that the rules thereof required that Mrs Aktar should have been called as a witness so that he could have had an opportunity to cross-examine her. The second was that he had received no sufficient notice of the complaint which he had to meet before the Discipline Committee and this criticism was developed in his own proof. The Lord Ordinary rejected both of these two particular criticisms, the pursuer no longer insists in them and we need say no more about them. The third particular criticism which was made on Record, without either clarity or precision, appeared to be that in some way the proceedings before the Discipline Committee were tainted by prejudice and unfairness in respect that Mr Clark was a member of the Committee when it convened and left it after making clear his hostility towards the pursuer, and that when Mr Brown replaced him the Committee just carried on "where they had left off". The Lord Ordinary rejected this criticism also and in his opinion said this --

"He does not believe that these issues were approached in a fair and unprejudiced way. On the contrary he repeatedly asserted that 'they were determined to get me out' and in cross-examination he maintained that the whole proceedings, including the proceedings before the Appeal Committee, was simply a conspiracy to achieve this result. I have no doubt that much of what the pursuer alleged could constitute a valid criticism of the attitude adopted by Mr Clark, and indeed Mr Clark openly conceded that the pursuer would not have had a fair hearing from him. He said in terms 'He hates me and I don't like him'. It would have vitiated the whole proceedings before the disciplinary committee if Mr Clark had been a party to the decision and his explanation as to why he had sat as a member of the committee at all was not satisfactory. The fact is however that he did disqualify himself from membership in the course of the proceedings, and these proceedings effectively began again after he had left and Mr Brown had taken his place. The pursuer asserted that Mr Brown's availability in the office at the time had been a matter of arrangement and that he would hear what had taken place before he joined the committee. I am satisfied Mr Brown happened co-incidentally to be in the office at the time and that, as he stated in evidence, he did not know what had taken place until he was informed that Mr Clark had left. He had not overheard the prior proceedings and he had not seen Mr Clark leave. Although all the members of that committee were undoubtedly influenced by the previous 'record' which was narrated to them by the convener, I am satisfied that they did give careful and impartial consideration to the issue before them, albeit that on this occasion they felt unable to give the pursuer 'the benefit of the doubt' which underlay the 'no action' decision in other instances involving the pursuer and other drivers." So far as the pursuer's case rested upon criticisms of the proceedings before the Appeal Committee the Lord Ordinary repelled them and the pursuer no longer insists in them.

At this point we have to say that the proof took an extraordinary course which presented the pursuer with a ground upon which to attack the proceedings before the Discipline Committee of which he had been entirely unaware until it emerged in the evidence led by the defenders. That evidence came from the three members of the Committee, Messrs Mellors, Robb and Brown, to the effect that they were all aware in general terms that the pursuer had been before the Discipline Committee on several other occasions to answer complaints of abusive conduct, mainly towards customers, and that after they had retired, and before deciding to accept that the complaint by Mrs Aktar was probably well founded, and to reject the pursuer's account of his dealings with Mrs Aktar which included a denial that he had been abusive to her in any way, they, in accordance with what seems to have been normal practice, had the Minute Book of the Discipline Committee placed before them by the convener, Mr Ford. They then went over the minuted record of every previous hearing at which complaints against the pursuer had been heard and determined by the Discipline Committee in one way or another. The minuted record of the pursuer, said each of the three witnesses in various ways, was a factor which led them to uphold the complaint by Mrs Aktar, and to determine the penalty which ought to be imposed. The point taken before the Lord Ordinary was that upon that evidence it was clear that in breach of the requirements of natural justice the Committee took the decision which they did by taking into account, with out his knowledge and in his absence, 'evidence' in the form of the minuted record of each of the pursuer's previous appearances before the Discipline Tribunal. There was no evidence that he was aware that it was the practice to have regard to the minuted account of a driver's previous appearance before the Discipline Committee before coming to a decision on the merits of a complaint. He had never seen the contents of the minutes relating to himself and was afforded no opportunity to correct or contradict them or even to address the Committee upon the significance which ought properly to be attached to his history as it had been recorded.

The Lord Ordinary in his opinion disposed of this new element in the pursuer's case as follows -- "The third ground of criticism of the manner in which the committee went about their consideration of the matter was the reference that was made to the pursuer's record. There is no question but that this was a material factor in influencing the decision which was reached and this factor was linked with the presence on the committee in the first instance of Mr Clark. The complaint on record in this connection is that this was not put to the pursuer at the hearing before the disciplinary committee and that the first time it was discussed was at the appeal hearing, in his absence. The most significant part of this record was a decision of the discipline committee on 20th September, 1980, when it considered two complaints, and when a remit was made to the full committee. By the time the full committee came to consider the matter on 6th October, 1980 a further complaint had arisen. At this hearing it had been proposed that he be suspended sine di An amendment was carried to the effect that he be suspended for a period of 28 days but if found guilty of a further complaint sine die suspension should follow. On appeal this decision was varied to the extent that a sine die suspension would follow if he was found guilty of a further complaint within one year of the decision, namely 13th October, 1980.

"I have no doubt that in fact all the members of the council, who constituted the discipline committee, were familiar, at least in general terms, with the past record of the pursuer in relation to customer complaints. The reference to past history was a recognised part of the procedure followed at these hearings and the record, as minuted, was not something which could be disputed. Counsel submitted that it was a serious flaw in the procedure that he was never given an opportunity to comment on the record and address the committee on mitigation of sentence. This is an aspect of the matter which has caused me some concern, having regard to the gravity of the 'sentence' which in the result was pronounced. I am driven to the conclusion, however, on the basis of the line of authority to which I have referred, that provided the committee considered this question in a careful and unprejudiced manner it was not an essential requirement that the pursuer should be heard on the matter. The gravity of the complaint was a matter for the committee to assess and the significance of the 'previous record' a matter for the committee to judge."

Before us, counsel for the pursuer contended that the Lord Ordinary erred in finding that the requirements of natural justice were not contravened in course of the proceedings before the Discipline Committee. He ought to have held that these were contravened in three respects: (1) the examination of the minutes describing the pursuer's previous appearances before the Committee, (2) the presence and conduct of Clark and (3) the absence of any sufficient evidence to permit the Committee to hold that the complaint of Mrs Aktar was established.

In presenting their submissions counsel for the pursuer recognised that their best point appeared to be that when the Committee retired to consider their decision they examined the contents of all the minutes relating to the disposal of previous complaints against the pursuer, and that what they read in these minutes led them to accept that Mrs Aktar's complaint was probably justified, and to reject the pursuer's explanation that he had not been abusive to her in any way. The Lord Ordinary does not make it clear that he understood that the essence of the pursuer's criticism of the Committee was that they had embarked upon a detailed scrutiny of the pursuer's minuted record in order to reach their decision on the merits of the complaint. The 'minutes' had been written up by the convener of each Discipline Committee after each hearing. On the evidence they were not shown in draft for approval to the members of the Committee concerned, or to the driver about whom the complaint had been made. The minute of a Disciplinary Committee hearing was shown to no one unless an appeal was taken against the decision of that hearing when it was placed before the Appeal Committee. In short, the pursuer had never seen the minutes relating to hearings of previous complaints against him, he did not know how the various complaints against him, he did not know how the various complaints had been described therein, or how his response to each had been written up, and he was given no opportunity to correct or contradict any entry therein or to comment upon the minutes, before the Committee proceeded to have regard to them in deciding whether or not to uphold Mrs Aktar's complaint. It is not in dispute that there was no evidence that the pursuer was aware that it was the Disciplinary Committee's practice to scrutinise the minuted record of a driver before reaching a decision on the merits of a complaint, or that they would do so in his case after they had retired to deliberate. In these circumstances the Lord Ordinary's major error was in holding that 'the reference to past history was a recognised part of the procedure followed at these hearings' that 'the record as minuted was not something which could be disputed', and that 'it was not an essential requirement that the pursuer should be heard on the matter'. In this case the minuted record of the pursuer was used as evidence which swayed the decision against him on the merits without his knowledge and without his having had any opportunity to deal with their contents. An opportunity was accordingly afforded for injustice to be done (Barrs v British Wool Marketing Board 1957 SLT 153, 1957 SC 72 -- the opinion of the Lord President (Clyde) at p 82).

In reply the defenders emphasised, correctly, that whether or not the requirements of natural justice have or have not been satisfied by the procedure followed in any case, depends on the circumstances of that case. The Discipline Committee in this case was a small domestic tribunal of an association of only 100 taxi drivers or operators, and it existed just as a committee of a club exists, to enable a complaint against a member to be heard by a number of his fellow members. No doubt this Committee must conform to certain standards of fair play but in the circumstances of this case it was not unfair to the pursuer that the Committee should have examined his record before coming to a decision on the complaint against him. The pursuer was known to the members of the Committee and they were known to him. On the evidence the Lord Ordinary correctly observed that the members were familiar, at least in general terms, with the past record of the pursuer in relation to customer complaints, and the pursuer knew pefectly well what his record was. It is really inconceivable that the pursuer did not know that the Committee knew what his record was, and would be bound to have regard to it in reaching their decision. The minutes were not open to challenge by the pursuer as the defenders' record of his previous history before the Discipline Committee, and it would in any event be ridiculous and time consuming to require that a driver facing a complaint should be given a chance to quarrel with the minuted account of his previous appearances. Further, the pursuer must have known that a minute was kept of every hearing by the Discipline Committee. He had, after all, sat once as a member of the Appeal Committee, and had appealed himself to that Committee against a decision of the Discipline Committee. All that happened in this case was that the Discipline Committee relied on a factor, known to the pursuer, in assessing his credibility.

Counsel for the defenders then proceeded to present two further submissions which had not been presented to the Lord Ordinary. The first was that, under reference to Adair v Colville & Sons 1926 SC (HL) 51 the Court should refuse to entertain the pursuer's criticism of the use made by the Discipline Committee of his minuted record since he had not availed himself of the opportunity to appear before the Appeal Committee where he would have had an opportunity of correcting this particular alleged injustice. The second was that it was necessary to look at the defenders' disciplinary proceedings as a whole. Even if the pursuer did not know that his record as minuted had been taken into account in upholding Mrs Aktar's complaint, he was bound to have known that his history would have played some part in the decision of the Discipline Committee, at least in fixing the penalty, and the minuted record would have been bound to have been in the forefront at the Appeal Committee. He cannot accordingly now complain that he was denied a fair crack of the whip.

The law which we have to apply is not in doubt, and the Lord Ordinary has correctly identified it after referring to a few of the many cases in which the standards of fair play required of various tribunals have been discussed. In these circumstances it is quite unnecessary for us to re-instate in our own words the test of fair play which the Court ought to apply in all the circumstances of a particular case, and we content ourselves by reminding ourselves of what was said in two cases. The first is Barrs v British Wool Marketing Board 1957 SLT 153, 1957 SC 72, where the Lord President said this:

"It is important to observe the width of this principle. It is not a question of whether the tribunal has arrived at a fair result; for in most cases that would involve an examination into the merits of the case, upon which the tribunal is final. The question is whether the tribunal has dealt fairly and equally with the parties before it in arriving at that result. The test is not 'Has an unjust result been reached?' but 'Was there an opportunity afforded for injustice to be done?' If there was such an opportunity, the decision cannot stand. Hence, if one party is allowed to give evidence, and this is denied to another, the decision would be reduced, not because the evidence led had convinced the tribunal, for this could hardly ever be established, but because the standards of fair play which underlie all such proceedings had not been satisfied. Similarly, in the present case, the real test for the validity of the decision of the tribunal is not 'Did the appraisers put forward arguments to the tribunal outwith the presence of the pursuer's representative?' The real test is 'Did the tribunal create a situation in which they gave an opportunity to the appraisers to put forward arguments without giving an equal opportunity to the pursuer's representative?' The second is Ceylon University v Fernando [1960] 1 All ER 631, [1960] 1 WLR 223 when, in delivering the judgment of the Privy Council, Lord Jenkins declared: "It seems to their Lordships to follow that inasmuch as the Vice-Chancellor, when the alleged offence under clause 8 was brought to his notice, was not bound to treat the matter as a trial but could obtain information about it in any way he thought best, it was open to him, if he thought fit, to question witnesses without inviting the plaintiff to be present.

But, while there was no objection to the Vice-Chancellor informing himself in this way, it was undoubtedly necessary that before any decision to report the plaintiff was reached, he should have complied with the vital condition postulated by Lord Loreburn, which adapted to the present case may be stated as being to the effect that a fair opportunity must have been given to the plaintiff to correct or contradict any relevant statement to his prejudice."

In our opinion, looking only at the proceedings before the Discipline Committee, counsel for the pursuer are correct in saying that in scrutinising the contents of the minutes relating to the pursuer's previous appearances before that Committee an opportunity was afforded for injustice to be done. He was not given any opportunity to comment upon the contents of these minutes or to correct or contradict any parts of the narrative therein of the proceedings to which they bore to relate. As was pointed out, the minutes, which were not circulated to the members of the Committee or to the driver involved, contained nothing more than the convener's own attempt to summarise his recollection of the details of the particular complaint, the substance of the driver' response to it, and the decision taken by the Committee. It is not suggested by the pursuer that in reaching their decision this domestic tribunal, consisting of his peers, could not properly take into account in assessing probabilities and his credibility, what they knew, only in general terms, about his history. This however, is not what the Committee did. In the pursuer's absence and without notice to him, they proceeded to use the contents of the minutes relating to the pursuer as the pivotal evidence which led them to accept the complaint of abusive conduct and reject his denial. It appears to us that making all due allowances for the informal nature of this domestic tribunal, fair play required that the pursuer should have been informed of the use which it was intended to make of the contents of the minutes, and should have been given the opportunity to see them, to comment upon them, and, if he thought fit, to correct or contradict any parts of the contents which he believed to be prejudicial to him or inaccurate or incomplete. This is not a case in which it can be affirmed that there was nothing the pursuer could have said. On the contrary, that he might have had something of relevance to say appears from his own evidence when the defenders took the somewhat astonishing course of cross-examining him upon the minutes in question. These minutes, for what they are worth, cannot be regarded as records which could not be disputed and the Lord Ordinary failed to realise that although the use made of the minutes may have been in accordance with the regular procedure of the Committee, there was simply no evidence that the pursuer was aware of this practice.

We are not at all impressed by the suggestion of counsel for the defenders that to require the Discipline Committee to give every driver facing a complaint a chance to challenge the minutes would involve a ridiculous and time wasting exercise. Any difficulty could be avoided if, after each hearing, the minute was not recorded in the book until it had been circulated in draft and account had been taken of any comments by the members of the Committee and the driver who had appeared before them. If this procedure were followed and it were made clear to a driver facing a complaint that the Discipline Committee would scrutinise his history as minuted in coming to its decision so that he would have an opportunity to comment upon the record if he wished to do so, it might well be said that the contexts of the minutes would be beyond dispute and that the requirements of fair play in this domestic tribunal would have been satisfied.

We are not impressed either with the defenders' two additional submissions on this chapter of the reclaiming motion. The short answer is that the pursuer was unaware until the defenders led their evidence at the proof in this action that the Committee had used his minuted record in the way they did. He could not accordingly have sought to have had this particular injustice corrected before the Appeal Committee, and even if the minutes had been mentioned at the Appeal Committee hearing, he would not have appreciated that their contents had constituted the pivotal evidence which had tipped the scales against him on the merits of the complaint.

For the foregoing reasons the reclaiming motion succeeds upon the submission for the pursuer which we have just considered. The Lord Ordinary's interlocutor will be recalled and we shall sustain the second plea in law for the pursuer.

In light of what we have decided it is unnecessary for us to examine closely the submissions for the pursuer upon the two other respects in which it was contended that the Discipline Committee had failed to observe the requirements of natural justice. We shall, however, express briefly out opinion on each of them.

Dealing first of all with the alleged prejudicial effects of the presence of the defenders' chairman, Mr Clark, as a member of the Discipline Committee, and of the circumstances in which he departed from the hearing, the argument was presented on the basis that, upon the evidence, Mr Clark and the pursuer disliked each other intensely, and that Mr Clark had demonstrated his hostility towards the pursuer before he chose to depart. According to counsel for the pursuer Mr Clark should not have been a member of the Committee when it convened and the attitude to the pursuer which he displayed at the hearing might well have prejudiced the minds of his two fellow members against the pursuer. The hearing should not even have begun and, in any event, the complaint should have been held over for consideration of a new committee on a later date. We have only to say that in our opinion the Lord Ordinary correctly rejected this attack upon the decision of the Discipline Committee and we endorse with approval his reasons for doing so which appear in the passage from his opinion which we have quoted earlier.

The final submission related to the evidence before the Committee. Before us the pursuer relied only upon a submission which had not been presented to the Lord Ordinary. It was no longer maintained that Mrs Aktar should have been called as a witness. The new contention was that, on the assumption that the Committee ought not to have had regard to the minutes in reaching a decision on the merits of the complaint, the only evidence properly before them was the complaint of Mrs Aktar as narrated by Mr Ford, the convener. It was presented without any evidence even from Mr Ford, containing an assessment of her credibility and reliability. This, it was said, was fatal. We have no hesitation in rejecting this final submission. The point taken was one which could properly have been taken on appeal and we question whether it has anything to do with the requirements of natural justice. Be that as it may we see no reasons why this domestic tribunal should not have disposed of the complaint simply by hearing details of it from Mr Ford, who placed it before the Committee because he had concluded that it was a serious one, seriously made, and the pursuer's response. The important matter for the Committee was then to reach a decision by evaluating the pursuer's response and his credibility. In the nature of things a Discipline Committee of a small association such as the defenders could not reasonably be required to do more.

Since the reclaiming motion has succeeded it is agreed that the pursuer must be awarded damages as the Lord Ordinary has computed them. In particular he will be awarded (1) in respect of loss to the date of the proof £1,900, with agreed interest at 7 1/2 per cent from 15 October 1982 to 25 July 1986 and thereafter at 15 per cent until payment; and (2) in respect of future loss £3,500, with agreed interest at the rate of 7 1/2 per cent from 25 July 1986 until payment.

DISPOSITION: Reclaiming motion allowed, the pursurer awarded damages as the Lord Ordinary has computed them.
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