Taxi Driver Online

I think by now it has probably become apperent that hire and reward constitutes any gratuity payment no matter what it is? Also, that any vehicle undertaking such activity must have the an apropriate license and insurance if they are to remain within the law?

This is yet another case which highlights the legalities of hire and reward?

VICTORIA MOTORS (SCARBOROUGH), LTD, AND ANOTHER v. WURZAL.

KING'S BENCH DIVISION

[1951] 2 KB 520, [1951] 1 All ER 1016, 115 JP 333, [1951] WN 233

HEARING-DATES: 19 April 1951

Street Traffic -- Stage carriage -- Special occasion -- Conveyance of guests once a week from holiday camp to railway station -- Road Traffic Act, 1930 (c. 43), s. 61 (2) -- Road Traffic Act, 1934 (c. 50), s. 25 (1).

HEADNOTE:
For the convenience of the guests staying at a holiday camp, the camp company arranged that a motor coach company should supply a coach each Saturday morning to take any guests who were leaving the camp to the station. The camp company informed their guests of the arrangement, and any guest who wished to travel by the coach bought a ticket from the camp company and gave it up to the coach driver, all the money for the tickets being handed over by the camp company to the coach company. Between June 3 and Aug. 19, 1950, the coach company supplied coaches on every Saturday, as required by the camp company. On Aug. 19, 1950, a motor coach belonging to the coach company took guests from the camp to the station under this arrangement. The coach company did not hold a road service licence in respect of the vehicle under the Road Traffic Act, 1930, s. 72 (1). Each of the companies was charged with an offence under s. 72 (10), it being alleged that the coach company permitted the vehicle to be used as a stage carriage without a road service licence and that the camp company caused the vehicle so to be used, in contravention of the sub-section. The companies contended (inter alia) that, as all the conditions set out in the Road Traffic Act, 1934, s. 25 (1), had been satisfied, the occasion was a "special occasion" within the meaning of the proviso to s. 61 (2) of the Act of 1930, so that a road service licence was not required.

HELD: the proviso to s. 61 (2) of the Act of 1930 and s. 25 (1) of the Act of 1934 must be read together, and, for an occasion to be a "special occasion" within the meaning of the proviso to s. 61 (2) so that a road service licence would not be required, it was necessary, not only that all the conditions laid down in s. 25 (1) of the Act of 1934 should be satisfied, but also that the occasion should be a special occasion in itself, i.e., an occasion of the kind illustrated in the priviso to s. 61 (1) of the Act of 1930; taking passengers every Saturday for a number of weeks from a holiday camp to the railway station was not a "special occasion" within the meaning of the proviso to s. 61 (2) of the Act of 1930; and, therefore, complicance with all the provisions of s. 25 (1) of the Act of 1925 did not make the journey on Aug. 19, 1950, a "special occasion" so as to render a road service licence unnecessary, and the companies were guilty of the offences charged.

Observations of DEVLIN, J., in Reynolds v. G. H. Austin & Sons, Ltd. [1951] 1 All ER 614, Applied.

CASES-REF-TO:

(1) Reynolds v. G. H. Austin & Sons, Ltd., [1951] 1 All E.R. 606; 115 J.P. 192.

INTRODUCTION:
CASE STATED by Scarborough justices.

On Aug. 19, 1950, under an arrangement between the first appellants, Victoria Motors (Scarborough), Ltd., and the second appellants, Scarborough Holiday Chalets, Ltd., a motor coach belonging to the coach company was used to convey guests leaving the holiday camp of the chalet company from the camp to the railway station. Each guest who used the coach paid to the chalet company 9d. for a ticket to enable him to do so, and the chalet company handed the whole of this sum to the coach company.The coach company did not hold a road service licence in respect of the coach.

On Oct. 6, 1950, at a court of summary jurisdiction sitting at Scarborough, on informations preferred by the respondent, acting on behalf of the licensing authority for the Yorkshire Traffic Area, both the appellants were charged, inter alia, with having committed offences against the Road Traffic Act, 1930, s. 72, the coach company being charged with having unlawfully permitted the use of the vehicle as a stage carriage, within the meaning of the Road Traffic Acts, 1930 to 1934, on various roads in the borough of Scarborough on Aug. 19, 1950, otherwise than under a road service licence, in contravention of s. 72, and the chalet company being charged with unlawfully causing the vehicle to be so used, in contravention of the section. The appellants contended that, as they had complied with all the conditions set out in the Road Traffic Act, 1934, s. 25 (1), the vehicle must be deemed to be used on a special occasion for the conveyance of a private party; that "special occasion" was defined by s. 25 (1) of the Act of 1934, and the meaning of the words was not in accordance with any narrower definition applied before the passing of that Act; and that the coach was not being used as a stage carriage or in any such manner as to require a road service licence. The respondent contended inter alia that the vehicle was not being used on a special occasion as the journey was one of a series of journeys regularly undertaken on Saturdays. The justices held that the occasion was not a special occasion and found the offences proved. The appellants appealed from their decision.

COUNSEL:
Van Oss for the appellants. J. P. Ashworth for the respondent.

PANEL: Lord Goddard, C.J., Oliver and Cassels, JJ.

JUDGMENTBY-1: LORD GODDARD, C.J.

JUDGMENT-1:
LORD GODDARD, C.J.: The first appellants (to whom I shall refer as "the coach company") are Victoria Motors (Scarborough), Ltd., motor coach proprietors, and the second appellants (to whom I shall refer as "the chalet company") are Scarborough Holiday Chalets, Ltd., a company which own a holiday camp outside Scarborough. They were each convicted before the borough justices at Scarborough (i) of an offence against s. 67 of the Road Traffic Act, 1930, and (ii) of an offence against s. 72 of the Act. It is now conceded by counsel for the respondent that the convictions under s. 67 cannot be supported, and the question for our decision is whether they were rightly convicted under s. 72.

The case arises in this way. As accommodation at the camp was let from Saturday to Saturday, a considerable number of guests who had been spending a holiday at the camp left it each Saturday, and, for their convenience, the chalet company arranged that the coach company should supply a motor coach each Saturday to take the guests from the camp to the railway station. The fact that a motor coach would be available was announced by a loudspeaker in the camp dining-room on Friday mornings and the guests who wanted to travel by the coach would then go to the office of the chalet company and pay 9d., in return for which they received a ticket which they later handed to the driver of the coach. Thus, under the arrangement between the two companies, the chalet company collected the money for the tickets and handed it over, later, to the coach company.The chalet company informed the coach company each week how many coaches would be required, according to the number of guests travelling. Between June 3 and Aug. 19, 1950, the coach company supplied coaches on every Staturday morning, as required by the chalet company.

On Aug. 19, 1950, the coach company supplied under this arrangement a motor coach in respect of which they did not hold a road service licence under s. 72 (1) of the Act of 1930. It was contended by counsel for the appellants that a road service licence was not necessary, because the occasion on which the vehicle was being used was a "special occasion for the conveyance of a private party," within the meaning of the proviso to s. 61 (2) of the Act.

The Road Traffic Act, 1930, s. 61 (1), as amended by the Road Traffic Act, 1934, s. 24, divides public service vehicles into the following classes:

"(a) Stage carriages; that is to say motor vehicles carrying passengers for hire or reward at separate fares and not being express carriages as hereinafter defined; (b) Express carriages; that is to say motor vehicles carrying passengers for hire or reward at separate fares none of which is less than one shilling or such greater sum as may be prescribed... © Contract carriages; that is to say, motor vehicles carrying passengers for hire or reward under a contract expressed or implied for the use of the vehicle as a whole at or for a fixed or agreed rate or sum."

As an express carriage is one which carries people at separate fares of not less than a shilling, the vehicle in respect of which the appellants were convicted was not an express carriage, but, as it carried passengers for hire or reward at separate fares, it was, if it came within the sub-section, a stage carriage. There is this proviso to the sub-section:

"Provided that a motor vehicle adapted to carry less than eight passengers [i.e., an ordinary motor car] shall not be deemed to be a stage carriage or an express carriage by reason only that on occasions of race meetings, public gatherings and other like special occasions it is used to carry passengers at separate fares."
In other words, a taxi-cab may stand at a railway station near to a racecourse to take up passengers for a race meeting at so much a head.

By s. 61 (2):

"It is hereby declared that where persons are carried in a motor vehicle for any journey in consideration of separate payments made by them, whether to the owner of the vehicle or to any other person, the vehicle in which they are carried shall be deemed to be a vehicle carrying passengers for hire or reward at separate fares, whether the payments are solely in respect of the journey or not."

That sub-section covers the case of a motor coach used, e.g., to take visitors to an exhibition, when the fare which is charged includes, not only the journey, but also the entrance fee to the exhibition. Section 61 (2) continues:

"Provided that a vehicle used on a special occasion for the conveyance of a private party shall not be deemed to be a vehicle carrying passengers for hire or reward at separate fares by reason only that the members of the party have made separate payments which cover their conveyance by that vehicle on that occasion."

If, therefore, a vehicle is used on "a special occasion," there need not necessarily be a road service licence in force in regard to the vehicle, as required by s. 72 (1) of the Act. The proviso to s. 61 (1), which deals with taxi-cabs and vehicles of a private nature, throws some light on what the legislature meant by "a special occasion" in the proviso to s. 61 (2).

The illustrations given in the proviso to s. 61 (1), viz., "race meetings, public gatherings and other like special occasions," are not exhaustive, and "a special occasion" can include, e.g., a day's excursion, a Sunday school party, a mothers' union party, and taking people to a dance or a football match.

Difficulties having arisen under the proviso to s. 61 (2) of the Act of 1930, the Road Traffic Act, 1934, s. 25, imposed certain conditions in regard to the use of vehicles on special occasions for the conveyance of private parties. Section 25 (1) of the Act of 1934 provides:

"For the purposes of the proviso to s. 61 (2) of the principal Act, a vehicle shall be deemed to be used on a special occasion for the conveyance of a private party where it is used on a journey in relation to which the following conditions are satisfied, and not otherwise (that is to say): (a) arrangements for the bringing together of all the passengers for the purpose of making the journey as a party must have been made by some person, not being the holder of the public service vehicle licence in respect of the vehicle or a person acting on behalf of the holder of such a licence or a person who receives any remuneration in respect of those arrangements; (b) the journey must be made without previous advertisement to the public of the arrangements therefor; © all the passengers must, in the case of a journey to a particular destination, be carried to, or to the vicinity of, that destination, or, in the case of a tour, be carried for the greater part of the journey; (d) no differentiation of fares for the journey on the basis of distance or of time must be made; (e) in the case of a journey to a particular destination the passengers must not include any person who, frequently, or as a matter of routine, travels, at or about the time of day at which the journey is made, to that destination from a place from or through which the journey is made."

Counsel for the appellants contends that s. 25 (1) is definitive, and that, if all its conditions are satisfied, whatever the purpose or occasion of the journey, it becomes "a special occasion for the conveyance of a private party," within the proviso to s. 61 (2) of the Act of 1930. If his contention is right, there would seem to be a considerable lacuna in the Acts, as s. 25 (1) of the Act of 1934 would enable, e.g., a hotel or a club to run a private omnibus service. I do not think that the construction for which he contends is right. I think that, on their true construction, the proviso to s. 61 (2) of the Act of 1930 and s. 25 (1) of the Act of 1934 should be read together, and that, for a vehicle to be used without a road service licence, not only must the occasion be a "special occasion" within the meaning of the proviso to s. 61 (2) of the Act of 1930, but the conditions laid down in s. 25 (1) of the Act of 1934 must also be satisfied. In other words, even if a private party wished to use a motor coach for a "special occasion" (e.g., to watch an international match), the vehicle could not be used without a road service licence unless the conditions set out in s. 25 (1) of the Act of 1934 were also satisfied. On the other hand, an occasion of a general description does not become a "special occasion" within the meaning of the proviso to s. 61 (2) of the Act of 1930 merely because the conditions set out in s. 25 (1) of the Act of 1934 have been satisfied. Taking visitors from a holiday camp or a hotel every Saturday seems to me to be the antithesis of a "special occasion." It is a general occasion. Counsel for the appellants contended that the protection given by the Acts to a special occasion could not be taken away because the special occasion happened on a great number of occasions. That may be so, but the occasion must be shown to be a "special occasion" in the first instance, and I do not think that the legislature could have intended a motor coach service between the camp and the station to be called "a special occasion," nor do I think that s. 61 (2) of the Act of 1930 and s. 25 (1) of the Act of 1934 can be construed in such a manner as to include a journey of that kind within the expression. It seems to me to be an occasion of the most ordinary description, and not "special" in any sense of the word.

I am fortified in the opinion which I have formed by the judgment of DEVLIN, J., in Reynolds v. G. H. Austin & Sons, Ltd. (1), in which, though it may possibly be said that his view on this point was obiter -- the other two members of the Divisional Court, HUMPHREYS, J., and myself, did not refer to it -- the learned judge clearly showed (ante, p. 614) that, in his opinion, the construction which I am now placing on these sections is the right one. Confusion often arises in these cases by the use of the word "deemed," which is now frequently used by Parliamentary draftsmen. If something is to be "deemed" to be something, it necessarily means that it is not in fact the thing which it is to be deemed to be. It has to be regarded as something which it is not. Here, for the proviso to s. 61 (2) of the Act of 1930 to apply, it must first be shown that the vehicle is being used on a special occasion, and, even when the occasion is shown to be special, the proviso is only to apply if the conditions set out in s. 25 (1) of the Act of 1934 are also satisfied. In other words, even if the vehicle is being used "on a special occasion for the conveyance of a private party," the occasion is not a "special occasion" so as to exempt the vehicle from the necessity of a road service licence under s. 72 (1) of the Act of 1930 unless the requirements of s. 25 (1) of the Act of 1934 are also satisfied.

The charge which was preferred against the chalet company under s. 72 (10) of the Act of 1930, was that they

"... did unlawfully use the said vehicle as a stage carriage within the meaning of the Road Traffic Acts, 1930 to 1934... otherwise than under a road service licence," and counsel for the appellants contended that there was no evidence that the chalet company used the vehicle. In my opinion, that contention completely falls.

For the convenience of its guests the chalet company asked the coach company to provide the vehicle, made all the arrangements, and collected the money. It seems to me plain that, if it was not a principal, it was an aider and abettor, and, therefore, under the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1848, s. 5, it could be charged as a principal. In my opinion, there is nothing in that point.

For these reasons, I think that the justices came to a right decision in a somewhat difficult case. The appeal fails and must be dismissed.

JUDGMENTBY-2: OLIVER, J.

JUDGMENT-2:
OLIVER, J.: I agree. I was very much impressed by the argument of counsel for the appellants based on the language of s. 25 (1) of the Orad Traffic Act, 1934. I could see the force of the argument that the sub-section is in its terms definitive, but, on the whole, I have come to the conclusion that the views expressed by DEVLIN, J., in Reynolds v. G. H. Austin & Sons, Ltd. (1), are right, and I agree with LORD GODDARD, C.J.

JUDGMENTBY-3: CASSELS, J.

JUDGMENT-3:
CASSELS, J.: I also agree.

DISPOSITION:
Appeals dismissed.

SOLICITORS:
Jaques & Co., agents for Whitfield, Bell & Smith, Scarborough (for the appellants); Treasury Solicitor (for the respondent).