Taxi Driver Online

HULIN v. COOK AND ANOTHER

Queen's Bench Division

76 LGR 115, 1977 RTR 345

HEARING-DATES: 22 June 1977

22 June 1977

CATCHWORDS:
Hackney Carriage -- Licence -- Taxi plying for hire at railway station in local authority's area -- Whether authorised by local authority's licence -- Whether permission required from British Railways Board -- Town Police Clauses Act 1847 (10 & 11 Vict., c. 89), ss. 37 to 68 -- Public Health Act 1925 (15 & 16 Geo. V, c. 71), s. 76.

HEADNOTE:
The Public Health Act 1925 provides by section 76:

"In any area within which the provisions of the Town Police Clauses Act 1847 with respect to hackney carriages are in force, those provisions and any byelaws of the local authority with respect to hackney carriages shall be as fully applicable... to hackney carriages... plying for hire at any... railway premises within such area, as if such... railway premises were... a street..."

A city council licensed a hackney carriage driver to ply for hire within their area under byelaws made in 1971 pursuant to, inter alia, sections 37 and 68 of the Town Police Clauses Act 1847. He plied for hire at the local railway station without having a permission which was required by byelaw 22(2)© of the British Railways Board Byelaws 1965, made under section 67 of the Transport Act 1962. He was charged with contravening byelaw 22(2)© and he submitted that there was no case to answer on the ground that the council's licence exempted him from the requirement of the board's byelaw. The magistrate was of opinion that section 76 of the Public Health Act 1925 had the effect of making the provisions of the Act of 1847 and the council's byelaws applicable to licensed hackney carriages on railway premises as on streets, and he upheld the submission and dismissed the information.

On the prosecutor's appeal,

Held, allowing the appeal, that the hackney carriage licensing system by local authorities under the Act of 1847, created no new rights for the licensee but was restrictive of the right of all citizens to ply for hire without a licence; and that section 76 of the Act of 1925 created no new right to ply for hire but extended the licensing system to railway premises; so that, thereafter, a hackney carriage plying for hire on railway premises required to have not only the local authority's licence to ply for hire within the local authority's area but also the board's permission in accordance with byelaw 22(2)© to be on the railway premises; that, therefore, the magistrate had erred in upholding the submission of no case to answer and, accordingly, the case would be remitted to him for the hearing to continue.

INTRODUCTION:
CASE STATED by South Glamorgan stipendiary magistrate sitting at Cardiff.

On 11 December 1975 informations were preferred by the prosecutor, Roy Hulin, an inspector of British Transport police, (1) against the defendant Raymond George Cook that he at Cardiff on 15 September 1975 did contravene byelaw 22(2)© of the British Railways Board Byelaws 1965 made under section 67 of the Transport Act 1962 in that while on the railway, without the consent of an authorised person, he did ply for hire contrary to byelaw 2, and section 67 of the Act of 1962; and (2) against the defendant Samuel Colin Smith there he at Cardiff on 15 September 1975 did aid and abet counsel and procure the defendant Cook in the commission of a summary offence in that the defendant Cook at Cardiff on 15 September 1975 did contravene byelaw 22(2)© of the British Railways Board Byelaws 1965 made under section 67 of the Transport Act 1962 in that while on hhe railway, without the consent of an authorised person, he did ply for hire contrary to section 35 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1952 and byelaw 2 and section 67 of the Act of 1962.

The magistrate heard the informations on 15 and 28 April 1976 and found the following facts. Cardiff General Station was owned by the British Railways Board. The defendant Cook plied for hire at Cardiff General Station on 15 September 1975 and his employer, the defendant Smith, told him to do so. The defendant Cook was not on the list of persons authorised by British Railways Board to ply for hire at Cardiff General Station. Sections 37 to 68 of the Town Police Clauses Act 1847 were in force in the City of Cardiff. The defendant Cook held a duly authorised licence granted by Cardiff City Council for the use of a hackney carriage. Byelaws of the Cardiff City Council 1971 had specified Central Square for a distance of 150 feet alone the south western kerb as a stand for a maximum of 20 hackney carriages. There was no stand in that square other than at Cardiff General Station.

It was contended by the prosecutor in reply to a submission by the defendants of no case to answer: (a) under section 57 of the British Transport Act 1949 no rights could be acquired over railway property; (b) British Railway Board having set aside a site for a hackney carriage stand under section 67 of the Transport Act 1962, had the right to make orders governing its use; © byelaw 22(2)© of the British Railways Board Byelaws 1965 gave British Railways Board power to prevent a lawfully licensed hackney carriage proprietor from plying for hire on their property unless with their authority; and (d) section 76 of the Public Health Act 1925 did not detract from the board's right as a landowner to specify who should or should not enter on its property whether he had previous permission to enter or not.

It was contended by the defendants, in a submission of no case to answer, that (a) section 76 of the Public Health Act 1925 applied to the stand for hackney carriages at the station and the stand fell within the Town Police Clauses Act 1847 and the Cardiff City Council byelaws; consequently British Railways Board could not determine by subsequent regulations which individual licence holders should be permitted to ply for hire at the stand; (b) Cardiff City Council byelaws limited the number of hackney carriages but imposed no limitation on individual licensees; © byelaw 22(2)© of the British Railways Board Byelaws 1965 was ultra vires because it imposed a fresh set of rules; and (d) there was a conflict between statute and byelaws and statute must prevail.

The magistrate was of opinion that, by virtue of section 76 of the Public Health Act 1925 (no contention of absence of consent under proviso (b) of that section having been raised before him) the provisions of the Town Police Clauses Act 1847 and the Cardiff City Council byelaws were applicable to licensed hackney carriage on railway premises as on streets; there being no restriction by the council limiting individual licensees to specific stands, the defendant Cook could not be restricted from plying for hire at any stand; and that where a conflict existed between statute and byelaws, the statute must prevail. Accordingly the magistrate upheld the defendants' submission and dismissed the information.

The prosecutor appealed.

The question for the opinioin of the court was whether the provisions of byelaw 22(2)© of the British Railways Board Byelaws 1965 were applicable to the holder of a hackney carriage licence plying for hire on the property of British Railways Board without the consent of the board.

COUNSEL:
ANTHONY SCRIVENER Q.C. and KEITH TOPLEY for the prosecutor.

HYWELL MOSELEY for the defendant Smith.

The defendant Cook did not appear and was not represented.

PANEL: Lord Widgery C.J., Melford Stevenson J. and Slynn J.

JUDGMENTBY-1: LORD WIDGERY C.J.

JUDGMENT-1:
LORD WIDGERY C.J. This is an appeal by case stated by the South Glamorgan stipendiary magistrate in respect of his adjudication as a magistrates' court sitting in Cardiff on 28 April 1976.

On that date the magistrate dismissed, on a submission of no case, two informations which had been laid by the prosecutor, who is an officer of the British Railways Police, against the defendants, Raymond George Cook and Samuel Colin Smith. It was alleged in regard to the defendant Cook that on a date specified in the information he contravened byelaw 22(2)© of the British Railways Board Byelaws 1965, in that while on the railway, without the consent of an authorised person, he did ply for hire, contrary to byelaw 2 and section 67 of the Act of 1962. The defendant Smith was charged that he did aid and abet, counsel and procure the defendant Cook in the same offence. The defendant Smith was the owner of the taxi and he was therefore brought in and charged summarily with aiding and abetting.

The magistrate, on a submission of no case, found on the evidence then before him that there was no case to answer and dismissed the information. The argument of Mr Scrivener today is that there was a case to answer and the magistrate misinterpreted the somewhat complicated and difficult statutory provisions in this case.

One begins, I think, logically by looking at the byelaw which is said to {118} have been infringed, 22(2):

"No person while upon the railway, shall, except by permission of an authorised person: -... © tout, ply for, or solicit alms, reward or custom or employment of any description."

The magistrate found as a fact that the defendant Cook, the driver, had been plying for hire in the Cardiff General Station, so there was on the face of it a finding of fact that byelaw 22(2)© had been breached. The reason why the magistrate did not accept that situation and proceed to a conviction on the strength of it was that it was argued before him, and argued successfully, that a line of legislation running in parallel with that which gave British Railways Board power to make byelaws had in fact exempted the driver from any responsibility towards British Railways Board even when he was plying for hire on a station the property of the board.

I note in passing that Mr Moseley has helpfully co-operated in many ways in this case, not least by accepting that the byelaws were intra vires British Railways Board by virtue of section 67 of the Transport Act 1962, which gives wide power to the board to make byelaws of that kind. As I say, the whole argument for the defence was that, although on the face of it there had been a breach of byelaw 22, there was in fact an excuse to be found in this parallel legislation, as I have described it.

What does the parallel legislation amount to? It amounted to this. One starts with the Town Police Lcuases Act 1847, section 37 of which authorised the commissioners to license vehicles to ply for hire within the prescribed distance in the town, city or place concerned. One finds, therefore, the conception at a very early stage of the local authority issuing licences to people who are to exercise the function of plying for hire within the city. The same Act provided by section 45 that there should be a penalty to be obtained from anyone who plied for hire who had not obtained a licence duly granted to him under section 37. One gets the conception - perhaps a little novel in 1847 but common enough today - of a citizen being told that he can do a certain thing only if he is prepared to take out a licence for the privilege, and that situation has prevailed in regard to taxi cabs since 1847.

What one must notice at once in my judgment, because it is fundamental to the whole of this case, is that section 37 and the remaining provisions of the Act of 1847 did not create new rights. No doubt the owner of a cab was entitled to drive down any street in Cardiff which was a public street because any citizen has access to a public highway. But that statute does not superimpose on that right of a member of the public any new and separate privilege of plying for hire. All that the Act of 1847 says is that the authority can issue licences to ply for hire, and if anyone plies for hire without a licence he commits an offence. The combination of those two provisions in sections 37 and 45 of the Act of 1847 does not, as I say, create any new right; it is restrictive. it restricts the previous right of all citizens to ply for hire on all roads, and provides that, within {119} Cardiff at all events, no one shall ply for hire unless he has the appropriate licence.

So the matter rested for quite a long time, and it was not until 1925 that any change of real consequence occurred. That was in section 76 of the Public Health Act 1925. Prior to the passing of the Act of 1925 it had been established (as we have been told by Mr Scrivener, and it has not been challenged by Mr Moseley) that a person plying for hire from private property did not commit an offence under the Town Police Clauses Act 1847, and since that had caused a certain amount of difficulty, particularly in railway stations which were private property, section 76 of the Act of 1925 deals with that situation. Section 76 provides:

"In any area within which the provision of the Town Police Clauses Act 1847, with respect to hackney carriages are in force, those provisions and any byelaws of the local authority with respect to hackney carriages shall be as fully applicable in all respects to hackney carriages standing or plying for hire at any railway station or railway premises within such area, as if such railway station or railway premises were a stand for hackney carriages or a street."

Reflect again on the situation before that section was passed. The licensing system of the Act of 1847 was in force but no right had been conferred on a licensee. It is contended however that under section 76 some new right to ply for hire was thereby conferred, but, in my judgment, that is not so. The position after the passing of the Act of 1925 was that the licensing system under the Act of 1847 was extended to a new area. It was extended to the area of the railways and to railway premises, and anyone wishing to ply for hire on railway premises thereafter required a licence under the Act of 1847, despite the fact that the property was private property, but nothing in the way of a further right was thereby conferred.

Once the Act of 1925 was passed, the position in Cardiff, and for all I know in other places as well, was simply this. The typical taxi driver who wished to serve customers in the area, whether they came from airport, railway stations, bus stations or elsewhere, would need the ordinary 1847 Act licence in order to carry on his trade in Cardiff at all. In addition to that, if he wanted to serve passengers in the Cardiff General Station, he would have to make his peace with the Railway Board in as much as he would require their consent under their byelaws before he could ply for hire within the confines of the railway property. That, in my understanding of the position, is how the law now stands, and it follows from that that the magistrate was in error when he considered, as he evidently did from the form of his case, that the effect of section 76 was to give a new right which had not previously existed in that it licensed taxi drivers to ply for hire in Cardiff.

I have every sympathy with the magistrate because this is a case which I personally found of considerable difficulty, but in the end of it all I am satisfied that the submission should have been rejected, and therefore I would allow this appeal and send the case back to the magistrate {120} with a direction to continue the hearing.

JUDGMENTBY-2: MELFORD STEVENSON J.

JUDGMENT-2:
MELFORD STEVENSON J. I agree.

JUDGMENTBY-3: SLYNN J.

JUDGMENT-3:
SLYNN J. I agree.

DISPOSITION:
Appeal allowed.

SOLICITORS:
Solicitor for the prosecutor - Evan Harding.

Solicitors for the defendant Smith - A. Brodie Smith & P. D. Mahoney, Cardiff.

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WHITE v CUBITT

[DIVISIONAL COURT]

[1930] 1 KB 443

HEARING-DATES: 15 November 1929

15 November 1929

CATCHWORDS:
Hackney Carriage - Stage Carriage - Motor Car - Plying for Hire in "public street, road or place" - Private Ground level with Road and unfenced - Metropolitan Public Carriage Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 115), s. 4.

HEADNOTE:
A motor car of which the respondent was the owner and driver plied for hire within the Metropolitan Police district, though not licensed to do so, upon a certain piece of ground. The piece of ground was private property belonging to an adjoining public house but rented to the respondent, it was level with the public street but marked off from it by a line of stone sets not raised above the street level; the public had no leave of access thereto except for the purpose of using the public house or the motor car. The car when standing thereon was in full view of the street:-

Held, that the piece of ground was a "public street, road or place" within the definition of the expression "stage carriage" in s. 4 of the Metropolitan Public Carriage Act, 1869, and, the motor car being in other respects within that definition, that the respondent was liable to the penalties imposed by s. 7 of the Act upon the owner and driver of an unlicensed stage carriage which plies for hire.

Observations in Birmingham and Midland Motor Omnibus Co. v. Thompson [1918] 2 K. B. 105, 113, 114 applied.

INTRODUCTION:
CASE stated by justices for the county of Surrey.

On May 1, 1929, Charles E. H. Cubitt (hereinafter called "the respondent") appeared before the justices sitting at Mortlake petty sessions to answer a complaint made by Joseph Albert White (hereinafter called "the appellant"), a police constable, by order and on behalf of the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, which charged that the respondent was the owner of an unlicensed metropolitan stage carriage, to wit, a motor car, index mark and number M. C. 7393, found plying for hire within the Metropolitan Police district, at the time and place mentioned below, contrary to the Metropolitan Public Carriage Act, 1869, s. 7. n(1) A similar

n(1) The Metropolitan Public Carriage Act, 1869, which is entitled: "An Act for amending the Law relating to Hackney and Stage Carriages within the Metropolitan Police district," contains the following provisions:-

Sect. 4: "In this Act 'stage carriage' shall mean any carriage for the conveyance of passengers which plies for hire in any public street, road, or place within the limits of this Act, and in which the passengers or any of them are charged to pay separate and distinct or at the rate of separate and distinct fares for their respective places or scats therein."

complaint was made by the appellant against the respondent as driver of the motor car, and by consent both the complaints were heard together.

The following facts were proved or admitted:-

On February 11, 1929, at 11.15, the respondent with a four-seater motor car, of which he was the owner and driver, was at the side of the Railway Tavern public house at the corner of Upper Richmond Road and Rocks Lane, Barnes. The motor car was standing in full view of the public highway on a private piece of ground, with a concrete surface, belonging to the public house, but rented to the respondent. The concrete surface was level with the road, but was separated from the highway by a line of stone sets, which formed a demarcation, but were not raised above the level of the road. That piece of ground was only used for purposes of the public house, and the public had no access thereto save for the purpose of using the public house or of entering the motor car. The motor car was licensed for revenue purposes as a hackney carriage, but was not licensed by the Commissioner of Police to ply for hire. Two ladies crossed from the road to the concrete surface and entered the motor car. The appellant and another police officer approached the motor car, whereupon the respondent said: "Are you going to the golf course?" The appellant replied, "Yes," and the respondent said, "That will be sixpence each." The appellant and the police officer accompanying him then entered the motor car, and each paid the respondent sixpence, in return for which the respondent handed each of them a ticket from a roll of consecutively numbered tickets with the price 6d. printed on each ticket. The respondent then drove the appellant together with the three other occupants of the motor car, from the concrete surface to the Richmond Park

Sect. 7: "If any unlicensed hackney or stage carriage plies for hire, the owner of such carriage shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding five pounds for every day during which such unlicensed carriage plies. ... The driver also shall in every such case be liable to a like penalty unless he proves that he was ignorant of the fact of the carriage being an unlicensed carriage. ...."

golf course. The respondent had on several occasions waited with his motor car upon the concrete surface and had conveyed members of the public therefrom to that golf club at a charge of sixpence for each person. The respondent did not exhibit any notice or advertisement to indicate that the motor car was for hire.

For the respondent it was contended: (1.) That the motor car was not plying for hire within the meaning of the Act; and (2.) that, assuming there was a plying for hire, it was not "in a public street, road, or place," in that the concrete surface was private property, and not repairable at the public expense.

For the appellant it was contended: (1.) That the vehicle was plying for hire; and (2.) that although the concrete surface belonged to the public house it was a "public place," in so far as it was not fenced off in any way, and the public could have access to it.

On the facts above stated the justices came to the conclusion that the vehicle was not in any public street, road, or place, and they therefore dismissed the complaints.

The question of law for the Court was whether on these facts the justices were right in dismissing the complaints.

COUNSEL:
H. D. Roome for the appellant. The justices ought to have convicted the respondent of the offence with which he was charged. The respondent's motor car was not licensed to ply for hire, and therefore, if it was a stage carriage within the meaning of the Metropolitan Public Carriage Act, 1869 n(1) , the respondent became liable, both as owner and as driver, to the penalty imposed by s. 7 of that Act. The respondent's motor car was a stage carriage within the meaning of that Act. The circumstances of the present case brought the motor car within every part of the definition of "stage carriage," which is contained in s. 4 of the Act. The expression "plies for hire" in that definition was applicable to the motor car at the time and place in question.

[ Moresby for the respondent. It is not now contended that the motor car did not ply for hire within the meaning of the definition.]

The piece of ground on which the motor car plied for hire was a "public street, road or place" within the meaning of the definition. It was part of a "public street." Apart from authority the circumstances show that, though it was private property, it came within that expression. It was level with the street, it was not separated from the street by any fence or partition, it was freely accessible to the public using the street, and it was so situated that a vehicle standing upon it was in full view of the street and could be entered by persons from the street as easily as if it was on the street. Moreover there is authority for the view that this piece of ground is a street inasmuch as in the case of Birmingham and Midland Motor Omnibus Co. v. Thompson n(1) both Avory and Atkin JJ. expressed the opinion that a piece of ground even less closely connected with the street than this was a part of the street. If this piece of ground was not part of the street, it was clearly a "public place" within the meaning of the definition.

That view is supported by the circumstances already mentioned. It is also in accordance with the authorities, a person having been held to have committed an indecent act in a public place who committed the act in an open place out of sight of the highway to which the public were in the habit of going without any right to do so: Reg. v. Wellard n(2) ; and it having been held that under the Vagrancy Acts the expression public place applied to a railway platform: Ex parte Davis n(3) ; a railway carriage in transit: Langrish v. Archer n(4) ; and a field used as a recreation ground: Turnbull v. Appleton n(5) . Even though the place was not a public place within the letter of the Act it should be treated as a public place within the spirit and intention of the Act, because to hold otherwise would be to sanction the mischief which the Act seeks to prevent - namely, the driving of stage carriages by unlicensed and presumably unqualified persons: per Avory J. in Birmingham and Midland Motor Omnibus Co. v. Thompson. n(1)

Moresby for the respondent. The decision of the justices was right. The respondent's motor car was not at the time in question a "stage carriage" within the Metropolitan Public Carriage Act, 1869, s. 7. n(2) It was not at that time within the definition of that expression given for the purposes of the Act in s. 4 thereof, because it did not at that time ply for hire in any "public street road or place" within the meaning of the last-mentioned section. The piece of ground upon which the motor car happened to be at that time was not a "public street" or "public road" within the section. This appears from the circumstances. The piece of ground was private property belonging to the proprietor of the neighbouring public house, it was separated from the road by a line of stone sets, and the public had no access to it except by permission of the owner for the limited purposes of using the public house or entering the motor car. The same view is borne out by the authorities. In Curtis v. Embery n(3) it was held that ground belonging to a railway company and separated from the highway only by a gutter was not a "street" within s. 3 of the Town Police Clauses Act, 1847.

[LORD HEWART C.J. The notion of a thoroughfare runs throughout the whole of the definition of the word "street" given in that section for the purposes of that Act.]

In Case v. Storey n(4) a hackney carriage while on the premises of a railway company by their leave for the use of their passengers was held not to be plying for hire in any public "street" within the meaning of the Hackney Carriage Act, 1831. The statements made by Avory and Atkin JJ. in Birmingham and Midland Motor Omnibus Co. v. Thompson n(1) to the effect that the place there in question was a public "street" were mere obiter dicta which were not necessary for the decision in that case. Neither was this piece of ground a "public place" within the meaning of s. 4 of the Act of 1869.

The word "place" in the section must be construed as ejusdem generis with the words "street" and "road" which accompany it in the section: see per Kelly C.B. in Case v. Storey. n(1) All these words are qualified by the adjective "public." The public have no doubt a right to enter the public house during lawful hours, but there is a direct entrance to the public house from the street, and the fact that they are at present permitted to pass over this piece of ground for the purpose of reaching the public house does not therefore make the piece of ground a public place. In Case v. Storey n(1) , already referred to, a hackney carriage while on the premises of a railway company for the convenience of their passengers was held not to be plying for hire in a "place" within the meaning of the Hackney Carriage Act, 1831. As s. 7 of the Act is a penal section the expression "stage carriage" there used must be strictly construed. The case of Reg. v. Wellard n(2) and other cases of a similar kind were criminal cases, and in order that a place may be a public place for the purposes of these cases all that is necessary is that it be a place that the public can see.

PANEL: LORD HEWART C.J., SWIFT, and BRANSON JJ

JUDGMENTBY-1: LORD HEWART C.J

JUDGMENT-1:
LORD HEWART C.J: This is a case stated by magistrates, and the question which it involves arises out of the hearing of a complaint made by the present appellant on behalf of the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police against the respondent, the owner of an unlicensed stage carriage being a motor car, which, as the appellant alleged, was found plying for hire within the limits of the metropolitan police district, contrary to s. 7 of the Metropolitan Public Carriage Act, 1869. A similar complaint was made against the respondent as driver, and both complaints were heard together. In the result the justices dismissed the complaint, and the question for this Court is whether in so doing they came to a correct determination in point of law.

The case really turns upon the true interpretation, in relation to the facts, of the definition of the expression "stage carriage" in s. 4 of the Metropolitan Public Carriage Act, 1869. n(1) [His Lordship read that section and continued:] It is frankly conceded by Mr. Moresby on behalf of the respondent that upon the facts of the present case all the elements in that definition were to be found except that the place here referred to was not a "public street, road or place." It is not denied that there was here a plying for hire. It is not denied that the locus referred to was a place. But it is said that it was not a public place within the meaning of this particular definition. [His Lordship reviewed the facts stated in the case to have been proved or admitted, observing that the respondent had conveyed or been ready to convey from the piece of ground in question to the golf club any member of the public who desired to go there without reference to any particular class or condition of the public to which he might belong, and continued:] In those circumstances the justices came to the conclusion that the vehicle was not in any public street, road or place, and their conclusion cannot be disturbed if in point of law that was an inference which could properly be drawn from the facts which had been proved.

The attention of the Court has been very properly directed to certain cases which are thought to have some bearing upon the matter here in question. It has not been necessary to refer to the series of cases involving controversies that may be thought to be of a somewhat artificial kind as to the meaning of the expression "plying for hire." But various cases have been cited for the purpose of illustrating the proposition that this particular place was not a public place within the meaning of this Act, though at the same time it is freely admitted that there is no case directly in point. The question is not concluded by authority, and we approach it as if it were a tabula rasa.

It seems to me that much light is thrown upon the matter by the observations of Avory J. in the case of Birmingham and Midland Motor Omnibus Co. v. Thompson. n(2) In that case he used these pregnant words: "I should like to add that if it were necessary to discuss the question whether these omnibuses were under the circumstances plying for hire in a street I should have liked further time to consider it.

I am not satisfied that it has been decided in any previous case that under such circumstances as those of the present - namely, the gate of the yard being open, placards and notices directing the public to the yard, and the omnibuses being visible from the street - these omnibuses might not properly be said to be plying for hire in a street, but it is not necessary to decide that, and I postpone the expression of any opinion upon it." n(1) In the same case Atkin J., now Lord Atkin, said: "There is one matter that I should like to refer to, though I express no opinion upon it namely, whether, if this case had to be sent back for decision upon the question, it would not have been open to the magistrates to find that the appellants here were permitting their omnibus to be used for plying for hire in a street. In this case the magistrates have found the contrary. I only desire to say that in another case it appears to me that upon similar facts it might be possible for the magistrates to come to a different conclusion." n(2)

It seems to me that those observations made with reference to the circumstances of that case are applicable a fortiori to the circumstances of the present case. Here the whole scheme and purpose of the arrangements which have, not without ingenuity, been made, were to enable this motor vehicle to ply for hire by attracting the public through being manifestly exhibited near the edge of the highway at a place to which the public were invited, to which the public had resort, and around which there was no sort of barrier, physical or other, to prevent the ingress and egress of the public.

In my opinion this place was as public as it could be, and was selected for the purpose of the respondent precisely because it was as public as it could be. Upon the materials, I think, there was no evidence to justify the justices in coming to the conclusion that for the purposes of this section, and with reference to the mischief against which this section is directed, this was not a public place.

I think, therefore, that the case ought to go back to the justices with a direction to convict.

JUDGMENTBY-2: SWIFT J

JUDGMENT-2:
SWIFT J: I agree.

JUDGMENTBY-3: BRANSON J

JUDGMENT-3:
BRANSON J: I agree.

DISPOSITION:
Appeal allowed.

Case remitted.

SOLICITORS:
Solicitors for appellant: Wontner & Sons.

Solicitors for respondent: Pierron & Morley.
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ARMSTRONG (APPELLANT) v OGLE (RESPONDENT)

[DIVISIONAL COURT]

[1926] 2 KB 438

HEARING-DATES: 10 May 1926

10 May 1926

CATCHWORDS:
Local Government - Hackney Carriage - Omnibus - "Plying for hire" without a Licence - Issue of Return Tickets - Picking up Holders of Return Tickets within prescribed Area - Town Police Clauses Act, 1847 (10 & 11 Vict. c. 89), s. 45 - Town Police Clauses Act, 1889 (52 & 53 Vict. c. 14), s. 3.

HEADNOTE:
The appellant was the driver of an omnibus, which was not licensed to ply for hire within the borough of Gateshead. While the omnibus was standing within that borough three passengers entered it with return tickets issued to them at Chester-le-Street entitling them to travel from Chester-le-Street to Newcastle-upon-Tyne and back either on the day of issue or at any future time. The tickets entitled the holders to leave or to join the omnibus at any point on its journey. The owner of the omnibus was a member of an association of omnibus proprietors whose vehicles ran regularly and frequently between Chester-le-Street and Newcastle-upon-Tyne. The return tickets were available for return by any omnibus belonging to a member of the association, and not merely by one belonging to that member by whom the ticket was originally issued. Separate fares were charged for each passenger, and the association made their own arrangements and adjustments to ensure that each member received the earnings of his own vehicles:-

Held, that inasmuch as the omnibus was being used in Gateshead for the collection and reception of passengers out of the large unknown and indeterminate class of persons who possessed return tickets it was plying for hire within the prescribed limits of the borough of Gateshead, and that therefore the appellant was properly convicted of an offence under s. 45 of the Town Police Clauses Act, 1847.

Principle stated by Montague Smith J. in Allen v. Tunbridge (1871) L. R. 6 C. P. 481, 485 applied.

Sales v. Lake [1922] 1 K. B. 553 distinguished.

INTRODUCTION:
CASE stated by justices for the borough of Gateshead.

An information was laid by the respondent, Richard Ogle, under the Town Police Clauses Acts, 1847 and 1889, against the appellant, Ernest Mason Armstrong, for having been found in the borough of Gateshead on January 16, 1926, unlawfully plying for hire with a certain omnibus within the prescribed distance in that behalf of the said borough, for which omnibus a licence to ply for hire there had not been previously obtained.

Upon the hearing of the information on February 3, 1926, the following facts were admitted or proved:-

At about 11-45 P.M. on January 16, 1926, a motor omnibus driven by the appellant was seen standing in Gladstone

Terrace, Gateshead, within the prescribed distance in that behalf of the county borough of Gateshead.

No licence to ply for hire within the said prescribed distance had then been obtained in respect of the said omnibus, as required by the statutes in that behalf.

Whilst the omnibus was so standing three passengers were seen to enter, and the omnibus then moved on to the Durham Road, with the apparent intention of proceeding southwards in the direction of Low Fell and Chester-le-Street.

A constable of the Gateshead county borough police then stopped the omnibus and interrogated the appellant and the passengers. He ascertained, and the justices so found as facts, that the passengers were travelling with return tickets issued to them at Chester-le-Street (a place not within the prescribed limits), entitling them to travel from Chester-le-Street to Newcastle-upon-Tyne, and to return from Newcastle-upon-Tyne to Chester-le-Street either on the day of issue of the said tickets or at any future time. Gateshead is situated between Newcastle-upon-Tyne and Chester-le-Street, and the tickets entitled the holders to leave or to join the omnibus at any point on its journey.

The owner of the omnibus was a member of an association of omnibus proprietors whose vehicles ran regularly and frequently between Chester-le-street and Newcastle-upon-Tyne, as well as in other directions. The return tickets mentioned were available for return by any omnibus belonging to a member of the association, and not merely by one belonging to that member by whom the ticket was originally issued. Separate fares were charged for each passenger, and the association made their own arrangements and adjustments to ensure that each member received the earnings of his own vehicles.

On the part of the appellant it was contended that, inasmuch as no fares were collected at Gateshead and no passengers were proved to have travelled upon the said omnibus except such as possessed return tickets as aforesaid, issued outside of the prescribed limits where the appellant was licensed to

ply for hire, there had been no plying for hire within the said limits, and therefore the appellant was not guilty of the offence wherewith he was charged. Sales v. Lake n(1) was cited in favour of the appellant, and it was further contended that the case was within the exception mentioned in s. 3 of the Town Police Clauses Act, 1889. n(2)

On the part of the respondent it was contended that the omnibus was being used for the collection or reception of passengers within the prescribed limits, and that the place where the fare was paid was an immaterial consideration. Rex v. Fletcher. Ex parte Ansonia n(3) was cited as an authority in favour of the respondent's contention. For the same reason it was contended that the case was not within the exception of s. 3 of the Town Police Clauses Act, 1889. n(2)

The justices were of opinion that Sales v. Lake n(1) turned and was decided upon the special facts there found, which were different from those in the present case. They considered this case more to resemble Rex v. Fletcher. Ex parte Ansonia n(3) , which they decided to follow, and accordingly convicted the appellant and imposed a fine of 10s.

(2) Town Police Clauses Act, 1847, s. 37: "The Commissioners may from time to time license to ply for hire within the prescribed distance ... such number of hackney coaches or carriages of any kind or description adapted to the carriage of persons as they think fit."

Sect. 45: "... If any person be found driving, standing, or plying for hire with any carriage within the prescribed distance, for which such licence as aforesaid has not been previously obtained, ... every such person so offending shall for every such offence be liable to a penalty. ...."

The Town Police Clauses Act, 1889, is by s. 2 to be construed as one with the Town Police Clauses Act. 1847.

Sect. 3: "The term 'omnibus' where used in this Act shall include

Every omnibus, char-...-banc, wagonette, brake, stagecoach, and other carriage plying or standing for hire by or used to carry passengers at separate fares to, from, or in any part of the prescribed distance;

but shall not include ...

any omnibus starting from outside the prescribed distance, and bringing passengers within the prescribed distance, and not standing or plying for hire within the prescribed distance."

By s. 4 the terms "hackney carriages" and "carriage" whenever used in ss. 37, 40-52, 54, 58 and 60-67 of the principal Act shall "be deemed to include every omnibus."

The question for the opinion of the Court was whether the justices upon the above statement of facts came to a correct determination and decision in point of law.

COUNSEL:
Konstam K.C. and Paley Scott for the appellant. The appellant was convicted under s. 45 of the Town Police Clauses Act, 1847, of unlawfully plying for hire with an omnibus within the prescribed distance without a licence having been previously obtained for the omnibus. The expression "within the prescribed distance" is defined in s. 171 of the Public Health Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 55), which incorporates the provisions of the Town Police Clauses Act, 1847, with respect to hackney carriages, as meaning "within any urban district." "Plying for hire" means soliciting with importunity or persistence. The definition of "omnibus" in s. 3 of the Town Police Clauses Act, 1889, would have been wide enough, but for the last exception, to include an omnibus carrying passengers through the prescribed distance and not plying for hire within the prescribed distance. The last exception to that section covers the present case, as the omnibus started from outside the prescribed distance and was not plying for hire within the prescribed distance; it was only picking up passengers who already held return tickets which had been purchased outside the prescribed distance. The question for decision is whether the appellant had a right to issue return tickets outside the prescribed distance, and whether picking up passengers who had return tickets within the prescribed distance was plying for hire within the prescribed distance.

[LORD HEWART C.J. The return tickets are available for the return journey by any omnibus belonging to a member of the associated proprietors, at any time after the ticket is issued, at any point of the journey and by any person. There is no provision that the ticket shall not be transferable. Except for the fact of the return ticket this would clearly be plying for hire within the prescribed distance.]

It is found in the case that the passengers that were in fact being carried on the return journey were the persons

to whom the return tickets had been issued. The place where the fares were solicited and collected was some distance outside the urban district of Gateshead; it cannot be suggested that that place is immaterial. The fact that the persons who were picked up as passengers on the return journey had already made a contract for their carriage on the return journey prevents the person picking them up from plying for hire. The bus did not pick up any one who was not the holder of a return ticket. The words "or used to carry passengers" in s. 3 of the Act of 1889 merely define an omnibus. There is no penalty for using an omnibus to carry passengers, but only for plying for hire without a licence.

[LORD HEWART C.J. What is there to prevent the tickets being sold at Gateshead for the journey to Chester-le-Street and the return ticket being used for the journey to Gateshead?]

It is found in the case that the tickets are only issued at Chester-le-Street. This case is covered by the decision of this Court in Sales v. Lake. n(1) That case shows that there must be a soliciting or waiting to secure passengers by the driver without any previous contract with them, and also an appropriation of a carriage to the soliciting or waiting in order that there may be a plying for hire.

[LORD HEWART C.J. In Sales v. Lake n(1) there was a vehicle appropriated to a certain small number of ascertained individuals. That case is very different from one where passengers may travel to their destination by one omnibus and return by another omnibus perhaps on a different day, and where the vehicle is open to collect a wide class of passengers.

SHEARMAN J. In Sales v. Lake n(1) the conductor was told to pick up booked passengers at certain defined places, but in this case the conductor is looking everywhere for any one who may hail him.]

The Acts were intended to regulate or to prevent any one from touting for hire with an unlicensed hackney carriage. If any one wishes to ply for hire with a carriage within the prescribed distance the carriage must be licensed, but a person may carry passengers through the area without

plying for hire. It was held in Sales v. Lake n(1) that if passengers are carried in performance of a contract previously made for the carriage of passengers that is not a plying for hire. In that case the vehicle was not designated when the contract for carriage was made. The contract in the present case is similar to the contract in Sales v. Lake n(1) , with the exception that it may be implemented on a different day. The question involved in plying for hire is not one of collecting passengers, but of soliciting persons to make a contract of carriage. In all the cases it has been held that "plying for hire" means soliciting or importuning urgently. In Sales v. Lake n(1) the char-...-banc was collecting passengers, but was not soliciting passengers. The facts in Rex v. Fletcher. Ex parte Ansonia n(2) were very different from the facts of the present case. That was a clear case of plying for hire. The sections of the Acts of 1847 and 1889 ought to be construed strictly and ought not to be held to apply to a case to which the sections were obviously not intended to apply: Birmingham and Midland Motor Omnibus Co. v. Thompson. n(3) In the present case the hire had already been paid in performance of a contract previously made, whereas in a case where a carriage is plying for hire there is no contract in existence and the hire has not previously been paid.

[Clarke v. Stanford n(4) ; Bateson v. Oddy n(5) ; and Allen v. Tunbridge n(6) were also referred to.]

Cave K.C. and C. J. Conway for the respondent. The phrase "plying for hire" is not used in these statutes in the sense of soliciting or importuning. In these statutes the word "ply" is used as an intransitive verb, and the true meaning is given in the Oxford Dictionary as "To wait or attend regularly, to have one's stand at a certain place for hire or custom." The more usual meaning of the word is to go to and fro. The statute however does not say "plying for hire in a street," but "plying for hire with a carriage." In Sales v. Lake n(1) the circumstances were such that there could not be a plying for hire, but it was not accurate in that case to say that plying for hire involved soliciting to secure passengers, other than an implied soliciting from the mere fact of going to and fro.

[AVORY J. The expression in s. 45 of the Act of 1847 is "driving, standing or plying for hire." If we adopt your interpretation of "plying for hire" is not that expression in that section redundant?]

The expression is a well known one, and includes standing for hire and driving for hire. There was no previous contract for a return journey by this particular bus. In Sales v. Lake n(1) a particular vehicle was appropriated to the particular passengers for a particular journey.

[They were stopped.]

Konstam K.C. replied.

PANEL: LORD HEWART C.J., AVORY, and SHEARMAN JJ

JUDGMENTBY-1: LORD HEWART C.J

JUDGMENT-1:
LORD HEWART C.J: [after stating the facts contained in the special case continued:] Then follows this important statement as part of the findings of fact in this case: "The owner of the said omnibus is a member of an association of omnibus proprietors, whose vehicles run regularly and frequently between Chester-le-Street and Newcastle-upon-Tyne as well as in other directions. The return tickets are available for return by any omnibus belonging to a member of the association and not merely by one belonging to that member by whom the ticket was originally issued. Separate fares are charged for each passenger, and the association make their own arrangements and adjustments to ensure that each member receives the earnings of his own vehicles." How much exactly is comprised in that last sentence it would be unprofitable to conjecture, but at least it seems to say as clearly as words can that notwithstanding any denomination by number or otherwise upon the ticket, adjustments are made so as to ensure that each owner of these omnibuses shall receive - what? The payment for the ticket which he happens to have issued, if he has issued any? Not at all: "the earnings of his own vehicles," which must clearly mean the earnings upon the return journey as well as upon the outward journey. A ticket has been produced; it is probably the most remarkable return ticket ever issued.

I will read everything that is upon it. "Chester-le-Street. 1s. 2d. R. Newcastle. General. No. 3." There is no limitation about transfer, and no date of any kind whatever upon the ticket, whether date of issue or date of return. It is quite clear that that ticket was available for a journey by any of these vehicles at any time by any person in whose possession it might happen to be.

In that state of facts it was contended on the part of the appellant - and, it is interesting to observe, the sole ground upon which the matter was put - that, inasmuch as no fares were collected at Gateshead, and no passengers were proved to have travelled upon the omnibus except such as possessed return tickets issued outside of the prescribed limits, there had been no plying for hire within the prescribed limits. The respondent, on the other hand, contended that the omnibus was being used for the collection or reception of passengers within the prescribed limits. The justices came to the conclusion that the argument for the respondent was right. They purported to follow the case of Rex v. Fletcher. Ex parte Ansonia. n(1) That case seems to have little bearing upon the present case, except that it was manifestly a case of plying for hire, and in it Lord Alverstone C.J. observed that what was being attempted was a device for evading the provisions of the statutes requiring a licence to be obtained to ply for hire within the urban district. In this case also I think the plan adopted by the appellant was a good plan for evading the statutes, but it was not good enough.

Great stress has been laid upon the decision in Sales v. Lake n(2) , but that case, in my opinion, is not so much this case as the opposite of it. What is the principle to be applied? It was stated in a single sentence by Montague Smith J. in Allen v. Tunbridge n(3) , where he said (referring to a previous case): "It appears to have been held there, that, if the proprietor of a carriage sends it to a place for the purpose of picking up passengers, that is a plying for hire within the Act.

That is very different from a customer going to a job-master to hire a carriage." The contrast is between a particular and definite private hiring and a public picking up of passengers. That principle was applied in Sales v. Lake n(1) to the particular facts which that case disclosed, and it is to be observed that Lord Trevethin C.J. said this n(2) : "If there had been any empty seats for which the driver was prepared to take in casual passengers, I think he would have been plying for hire." That was a case of a particular vehicle about to enter upon a particular journey, with a defined number of seats to be occupied by particular ascertained persons. That case is very different from the present case; indeed, there is a complete lack of resemblance between the two cases. Here the alleged contract was made about no particular omnibus; it was made about no particular person; it had to do with no particular journey; it was not limited to any particular day, week, month, year, or even quinquennial period. When this particular omnibus set out upon its journey all the driver of it knew about the persons he was to collect and pick up in order to bring them back was that they were to belong to a large, unknown, indeterminate class of persons who happened to possess these return tickets, and to whom, if they attracted his attention, he was to offer a place in his omnibus. If that is not picking up passengers, I do not know what is.

It is quite true that in a particular passage in Sales v. Lake n(3) it is said that "plying for hire" means "soliciting custom without any previous contract," but that passage must of course be read secundum subjectam materiam. It could not for a moment be seriously suggested that it meant that there could be no plying for hire if it was possible to point to some sort of a contract between any person and some other person. What was being referred to there was a particular and precise contract to carry a particular person or particular persons for a particular journey by means of a particular vehicle. Now this case, so far from dealing with particular or private or personal contracts, has the word "general" written all over it, as indeed has the little ticket itself. Here there was not a private hiring; there was a public and general service, and the contrast pointed out by Montague Smith J. in Allen v. Tunbridge n(1) clearly applies.

What in strictness is the question raised by this special case? The justices upon the materials before them have found that here there was, within the meaning of the section, a plying for hire with a carriage. The question for this Court, I think, is whether there were facts from which the justices, rightly interpreting the law, could draw the conclusion that there was on this occasion a plying for hire. I am satisfied that they could draw that conclusion, and, indeed, that they were bound to draw it, though that does not matter.

In these circumstances, and for these reasons, I think that this appeal fails.

JUDGMENTBY-2: AVORY J

JUDGMENT-2:
AVORY J: I am of the same opinion. Having been a party to the judgment in Sales v. Lake n(2) I have listened sympathetically to the argument of Mr. Cave in support of the conviction in this case, because it was only after considerable hesitation that McCardie J. and I in Sales v. Lake n(2) came to the conclusion that we could not say that the magistrate was wrong in that case in holding that there was no plying for hire by a stage carriage within the meaning of s. 7 of the Act of 1869, which was then under consideration. I agree entirely with my Lord that the distinction between the present case and Sales v. Lake n(2) is to be found in this. Lord Trevethin C.J. in that case said n(3) : "In my judgment a carriage cannot accurately be said to ply for hire unless two conditions are satisfied. (1.) There must be a soliciting or waiting to secure passengers by the driver or other person in control without any previous contract with them." I need not read the second condition, because that applied only to the question whether there was any vehicle at that time the subject of any contract.

Now I am satisfied that in using those words Lord Trevethin meant that to satisfy that condition there must be a previous contract, that is a particular contract with particular passengers to drive them in some particular vehicle. When I said in my judgment n(1) , that "'plying for hire' means soliciting custom without any previous contract," I certainly never intended to include a contract of such a nature as that which is relied upon in this case, because I think that the inference which ought to be drawn from the special case is that the omnibuses which pick up passengers on the return journey have a pecuniary interest in picking them up and carrying them. That can only be, I think, the meaning of the words that "each member receives the earnings of his own vehicles." Although there is no contract that the passenger shall be carried by that particular vehicle, the vehicle in fact has a pecuniary interest in picking up the passengers. That seems to me to make the distinction between the present case and Sales v. Lake n(2) , and for these reasons I agree that this conviction should be supported.

JUDGMENTBY-3: SHEARMAN J

JUDGMENT-3:
SHEARMAN J: I agree, and I have only two observations to add. One is provoked by the statement of my brother Avory that he had some doubt whether Sales v. Lake n(2) was properly decided, although eventually he came to the conclusion that he expressed in his judgment. In my opinion the decision in that case was perfectly right, and I think that my brother Avory was quite right in the decision he came to in that case. But Sales v. Lake n(2) is not this case. As I understand "plying for hire" a distinction was drawn in that case, as in many previous cases, between offering a seat in a carriage to a member of the public and particular individuals hiring a carriage for a particular journey. This case is neither the one nor the other; one has not the same alternative, and the word "contract" alluded to in that case refers to a contract by one or more definite individuals to take a definite journey in a carriage to be provided for them for that purpose on a definite day. With regard to the contractual right which is alleged by Mr. Konstam to exist in the present case, to put it at its best, it is something like the second half of a return ticket given by a railway company, which gives a right to travel back by a number of trains.

It is quite obvious from the findings in the case that there was a very large number of persons who were entitled to travel by these omnibuses, because it is found that the omnibuses ran on this journey frequently and at regular intervals, which means that there must have been a great number of persons entitled to travel by them. It is not necessary in finding a plying for hire that the justices should be satisfied that every member of the public is invited to travel for hire; it is sufficient if there is a large section of the public who are invited to travel for hire.

I do not think it could be argued, if for instance an omnibus ran to a particular camp and only carried soldiers in it for hire and picked up everybody that was in uniform, that the omnibus was private, on the ground that it was confined to a particular, though a large, class of persons. I think in this particular case it is quite clear that the justices were right in finding that when the appellant ran an omnibus through the streets of Gateshead, stopping at definite places and going along a definite route and picking up persons who the driver and the conductor had probably never seen before, because they were members of a large class of persons who were in possession of a return ticket, there was a plying for hire. For these reasons I think this appeal should be dismissed.

DISPOSITION:
Appeal dismissed.

SOLICITORS:
Solicitors for appellant: King, Wigg & Co., for F. J. Lambert, Gateshead.

Solicitors for respondent: Maples, Teesdale & Co., for Lambert & Lambert, Gateshead.
__________________________

All Railway cases, Plying for hire.


BIRMINGHAM AND MIDLAND MOTOR OMNIBUS COMPANY, APPELLANTS v THOMPSON, RESPONDENT

[DIVISIONAL COURT]

[1918] 2 KB 105

HEARING-DATES: 18 April 1918

18 April 1918

HEADNOTE:
The effect of the Town Police Clauses Act, 1889, which brings omnibuses within the provisions of the Town Police Clauses Act, 1847, relating to hackney carriages, is that omnibuses are required to have a licence when plying for hire at any place "within the prescribed distance," whether in a public street or not.

INTRODUCTION:
CASE stated by justices of Walsall.

An information was laid by the respondent against the appellant company charging that they being the proprietors of an omnibus permitted the same to be used as a hackney carriage standing and plying for hire within the borough of Walsall without having obtained a licence as required by the Town Police Clauses Acts, 1847 and 1889.

By s. 37 of the Town Police Clauses Act, 1847, "The Commissioners may from time to time license to ply for hire within the prescribed distance ... such number of hackney coaches or carriages ... as they think fit."

Sect. 38: Every wheeled carriage ... used in standing or plying for hire in any street within the prescribed distance ... shall be deemed to be a hackney carriage within the meaning of this Act; ... provided always that no stage coach used for the purpose of standing or plying for passengers to be carried for hire at separate fares ... shall be deemed to be a hackney carriage within the meaning of this Act."

Sect. 45: "If the proprietor ... of any carriage ... permits the same to be used as a hackney carriage plying for hire within the prescribed distance without having obtained a licence as aforesaid for such carriage ... such person so offending shall for every such offence be liable to a penalty not exceeding 40s."

By s. 2 of the Town Police Clauses Act, 1889, that Act is to be construed as one with the Act of 1847.

Sect. 3: "The term 'omnibus' where used in this Act shall include every omnibus ... stage coach and other carriage plying or standing for hire by or used to carry passengers at separate fares to, from, or in any part of the prescribed distance; but shall not include ... any carriage starting from and previously hired for the particular passengers thereby carried at any livery stable yard (within the prescribed distance) whereat horses are stabled and carriages let for hire, the said carriage starting from the said stable yard ... and not standing or plying for hire within the prescribed distance."

Sect. 4, sub-s. 1: "The several terms 'hackney carriages' ... and 'carriage' whenever used in sections 37, 40 to 52" (of the Act of 1847) "shall notwithstanding anything contained in s. 38 of that Act, be deemed to include every omnibus."

The corporation of the borough of Walsall are the urban authority for the urban district of Walsall under the Public Health Act, 1875, and as such are the licensing authority in respect of hackney carriages, including omnibuses, under the Town Police Clauses Acts, 1847 and 1889, and have the powers and duties in respect thereof formerly vested in the Commissioners under the Act of 1847. Sect. 171 of the Public Health Act, 1875, defines the expression "within the prescribed distance" in the Act of 1847 as meaning, for the purposes of the Public Health Act, "within any urban district."

At the hearing of the information the following facts were proved:-

(a) Prior to June 30, 1917, the appellant company had been running a motor omnibus service between New Street in the city of Birmingham and Walsall under licences issued by the city of Birmingham and the Perry Barr Urban District Council and with the consent of the borough of Walsall. Since June 30, 1917, the appellants have continued running a twenty minutes' service on weekdays and a thirty minutes' service on Sundays between the said places.

(b) In the month of May, 1917, the corporation of Walsall gave notice to the appellants that they refused to consent to their running motor omnibuses within the borough after June 30, 1917.

(c) Before that date not only did the said omnibuses when coming from Birmingham set down their passengers in the public streets in Walsall, but they also when commencing the return journey to Birmingham started from a certain spot in a public street in Walsall called Leicester Street.

(d) On and after July 1, 1917, the appellants' motor omnibuses continued to run between Walsall and Birmingham without any licence or consent in respect thereof having been given or issued by the Walsall Corporation. The omnibuses from Birmingham to Walsall set down their passengers anywhere in the public streets in Walsall. When the passengers had dismounted the omnibuses proceeded to a garage called Darwall garage, pulled inside the garage yard, and turned round to be ready for the return journey to Birmingham. Passengers were required to enter the omnibuses while standing in the yard, and all fares had to be collected and tickets punched before they left the yard. When time was up the omnibuses travelled as far as the Walsall borough boundary without stopping, and no passengers were picked up after leaving the yard until that boundary was passed.

(e) The Darwall garage and garage yard were private property and within the urban district of Walsall.

(f) Shortly before June 30, 1917, the appellants gave notice by placard posted at various places in the town that the motor omnibuses for Birmingham would in future start from the Darwall garage. On some of the placards was printed the figure of a hand pointing in the direction of the garage yard.

(g) Similar notices were advertised by the appellants in the local newspapers and in their published time-tables.

(h) The gate of the garage yard always remained open during the hours the omnibuses were running, and the standing omnibuses were always visible from Darwall Street. On the relevant dates officials of the company stood at the Darwall Street entrance to the yard, and in Leicester Street directed intending passengers to the omnibuses.

(k) The omnibuses of the appellants were not used in standing or plying for hire in any street within the urban district, but the justices found that they were used by the appellants in standing or plying for hire within the prescribed distance. It was contended for the appellants that they did not require a licence as their omnibuses were not used in standing or plying for hire in any street.

The justices overruled that contention and convicted the appellants.

COUNSEL:
Tomlin, K.C., and Bruce Thomas, for the appellants. The appellants' omnibuses did not require a licence. The only carriages which under the Act of 1847 are required to be licensed to ply for hire within the prescribed distance are "hackney carriages," and if that Act stood alone the appellants would be entitled to say that there were two reasons why their omnibuses were not hackney carriages. In the first place, a hackney carriage is defined in s. 38 of that Act to be a carriage which is "used in standing or plying for hire in any street within the prescribed distance," and the omnibuses in question though they plied for hire within the prescribed distance did not do so in any street. Secondly, omnibuses, that is to say stage coaches carrying passengers at separate fares, are by the same section expressly excluded from the definition of "hackney carriage," even though plying for hire in a public street. That second defence is taken away by the Act of 1889, by s. 4, sub-s. 1, of which "hackney carriage" is to include "omnibus," anything contained in s. 38 of the earlier Act notwithstanding. But the other defence that the omnibuses were not plying for hire in a street remains. It is true that s. 3 of the Act of 1889, in defining "omnibus" as a stage coach or other carriage "plying or standing for hire by or used to carry passengers at separate fares to, from, or in any part of the prescribed

distance," omits the words "in any street" after the words "plying for hire." But no stress can be laid upon that omission. For in none of the sections dealing with hackney carriages in the earlier Act, except the definition section s. 38, do the words "in any street" occur. Yet in all of them must those words be understood, for the words "plying for hire" must be read by the light of the definition; and when s. 45, which creates the offence, speaks of permitting a carriage "to be used as a hackney carriage plying for hire" it must clearly be understood as meaning "to be used for the purpose of plying for hire in a street." And if the omission of the words "in any street" is to be regarded as immaterial in the several sections of the earlier Act, it must equally be so in s. 3 of the Act of 1889, for by s. 2 the two Acts are to be read together as one Act, and it cannot be that the same word "hackney carriage" can have two different meanings in the same Act, one as applied to cabs and another as applied to omnibuses. Moreover, it was obviously the intention of the Legislature in the later Act to put omnibuses and other carriages on precisely the same footing in respect of the place of their plying for hire, for s. 3 expressly excludes "any carriage starting from and previously hired for the particular passengers thereby carried at any stable yard whereat horses are stabled and carriages let for hire." So that if the appellants' omnibuses had been horse-drawn they would have come directly within that exception.

At the date of that Act motor omnibuses were not invented. Had they been the exception would have presumably been extended to apply to them. It is true that there is a difficulty in the appellants claiming the benefit of the exception as it stands, for there is no evidence of there having been any horse-drawn carriages or horses stabled in the Darwall garage yard. But the nature of the exception goes to show forcibly that the omission of the words "in any street" in the earlier part of s. 3 was unintentional and not meant to alter the meaning of "hackney carriage" as applied to an omnibus.

Barrington-Ward, for the respondent. No doubt under the Act of 1847 the appellants, even if omnibuses had not been expressly excluded from the operation of that Act, would have committed no offence, for though their omnibuses were paying for hire - Clarke v. Stanford n(1) - they were not plying for hire in a street: Curtis v. Embery. But the Act of 1889 has introduced a new subject-matter, and the penalty section of the earlier Act, s. 45, now applies not only to hackney carriages as in that Act defined, but also to omnibuses as defined in s. 3 of the Act of 1889.

The words of s. 45 must now be read as if the words were "If the proprietor ... permits the same to be used as a hackney carriage or as an omnibus plying for hire." The omission of the words "in any street" in the definition of omnibus in s. 3 of the later Act was intentional. It was specially desirable that omnibuses should be brought under the control of the local authority. As respects the extent of that control there is a distinction between carriages hired by individual persons, such as ordinary cabs, and omnibuses which carry a large number of wholly independent passengers. Whereas it may be enough, in the case of the former, that the local authority should exercise control in respect of the place where they ply for hire, in the case of the latter it is desirable that that control should continue to be exercised after the omnibuses have ceased to ply for hire and while they are on their journey.

Tomlin, K.C., in reply.

PANEL: DARLING, AVORY, and ATKIN JJ

JUDGMENTBY-1: DARLING J

JUDGMENT-1:
DARLING J: In my opinion this appeal should be allowed. There is nothing in the Act of 1889 which imposes any penalty. The only penal section is s. 45 of the Act of 1847; and before the proprietor of an omnibus can be convicted of an offence under that section it must be shown that his omnibus was a "hackney carriage" within the definition of that term in s. 38 - that is to say, that it was standing or plying for hire in a street. It is said that the effect of the Act of 1889 is that s. 45 of the earlier Act must be read as if the words were "permits the same to be used as a hackney carriage plying for hire" - that is to say, in a street "or as an omnibus plying for hire" whether in a street or not. With that contention I cannot agree. I think that, whether the carriage is an omnibus or not, it must, in order to come within the penal section, be within the definition of "hackney carriage." No doubt s. 3 of the Act of 1889 says that "the term 'omnibus' shall include every omnibus ... stage coach and other carriage plying or standing for hire by or used to carry passengers at separate fares," omitting the words "in any street."

But no reliance is to be placed on that omission, for in none of the sections of the Act of 1847 in which the words "standing or plying for hire" occur are those words followed by the words "in any street" except in the definition section, s. 38; and it cannot be disputed that until the word "omnibus" was introduced by the later Act no carriage could be regarded as "plying for hire" within the penal section unless it was plying for hire in a street. Therefore the mere fact that s. 3 of the later Act omits the words "in any street" is to my mind immaterial; it stands, in respect of that omission, on precisely the same footing as the sections in the earlier, in which those words are also omitted. Moreover, I think that the later provision of s. 3 points in this direction, where it says that the term "omnibus" shall not include "any carriage starting from and previously hired for the particular passengers thereby carried at any livery stable yard ... whereat horses are stabled and carriages let for hire." If then these omnibuses instead of being motor-driven had been drawn by horses, the appellants could not have been proceeded against, provided the horses which drew the omnibuses were kept in the yard from which they started; and it is quite possible that even in the case of motor omnibuses the difficulty might be got over by putting a few horses into the yard and letting out horse carriages as well as motor carriages.

But it is to my mind clear that the reason why horse-drawn omnibuses starting from a stable yard are excepted is not because they are horse-drawn or because their starting point is a stable yard, but because they do not ply for hire in a street, and do not invite passengers to get in after they have once started.

JUDGMENTBY-2: AVORY J

JUDGMENT-2:
AVORY J: In my opinion this conviction was right and the appeal should be dismissed. The information charged the defendants with an offence under s. 45 of the Town Police Clauses Act, 1847, namely, that they unlawfully permitted an omnibus to be used as a hackney carriage standing or plying for hire within the limits of the borough of Walsall without having obtained a licence. Before I deal with the question whether the conduct of the defendants brings them within the letter of that section I should like to say that it is to my mind perfectly clear that it is within the mischief contemplated by the statute, because if the argument for the appellants is right, it follows that the drivers of these omnibuses need not be licensed.

They may be driven by any unlicensed and incompetent person. It follows also that all the by-laws and regulations made by the local authority for the control of public vehicle swill have no application to them. I think it is important to look at the powers conferred upon the local authority by the later Act of 1889. By s. 6 of that Act the Commissioners may from time to time make by-laws for certain purposes which are set out - that is to say, for regulating the conduct of proprietors, drivers, and conductors of omnibuses plying within the prescribed distance; regulating the number of persons to be carried by such omnibuses; regulating and securing the fitness of the omnibuses; securing the proper lighting of lamps for denoting the direction in which the omnibus is proceeding; providing for the exhibition of the fares to be charged to different places; and preventing - and this is particularly important in the present case - within the prescribed distance the owner, driver, or conductor of any omnibus, or any other person on their or his behalf touting, calling out, or otherwise importuning any persons to use or to be carried for hire in such omnibus. Now it is clear that if the appellants are right none of these regulations would apply to their omnibuses, although they would certainly be within the mischief aimed at by the Act. At the same time I quite agree that that is not a sufficient reason for straining the language of a statute and holding that it applies to a case to which it was obviously not intended to apply.

I come now to the question whether the appellants' conduct comes within the letter of the statutes. It seems to me that the argument of Mr. Barrington-Ward is sound and that the effect of the Act of 1889 is to add the word "omnibus" to the words "hackney carriage" in s. 45 of the Act of 1847, so that it now reads "If the proprietor of any carriage permits the same to be used as a hackney carriage or as an omnibus plying for hire within the prescribed distance without having obtained a licence as aforesaid for such carriage" he shall be liable to a penalty. If that is the proper reading it is clear that the defendants did permit a carriage to be used as an omnibus plying for hire within the prescribed distance; and it is not contended by Mr. Tomlin that the words "plying for hire" by themselves must be restricted to plying for hire in a public street, but it is suggested that s. 45 must be read as limited to a hackney carriage as defined by s. 38, that is to say, a carriage standing or

plying for hire in a street. Now it appears to me that the Act of 1889 does not say that an omnibus shall only be deemed to be a hackney carriage when it comes within the definition of s. 38. It says, in s. 4, that an omnibus shall be a hackney carriage for the purposes of various sections, including s. 45; and if an omnibus is a hackney carriage for the purpose of s. 45, then any omnibus which plies for hire within the prescribed distance without a licence is within that section, and the proprietor who permits it is liable to a penalty. It is to be observed that by s. 3 of the Act of 1889 the term "omnibus" is to include, among other things, a "stage coach and other carriage plying or standing for hire by or used to carry passengers at separate fares." Such a stage coach was expressly excluded from the operation of the Act of 1847, and I think it is matter of common knowledge that at that date stage coaches more often than not started from, and took in their passengers in, the private yard of an inn; from which it is plain that the Legislature thought that but for such express exclusion a stage coach would have come within the operation of the Act notwithstanding that it did not ply for hire in a street. In the later Act the Legislature when expressly including a stage coach must equally be taken to have done so in view of the fact that stage coaches usually started on their journey, as I have said, from the yard of some inn as distinguished from a street. Further, s. 3 goes on to exclude, amongst other carriages, omnibuses used by railway companies for conveying passengers and their luggage to or from railway stations. The reason for such exclusion was that otherwise they would have been included in the term "omnibus" and would have been brought within the provisions of the Act of 1847. For these reasons I think the conviction was right. I should like to add that if it were necessary to discuss the question whether these omnibuses were under the circumstances plying for hire in a street I should have liked further time to consider it. I am not satisfied that it has been decided in any previous case that under such circumstances as those of the present - namely, the gate of the yard being open placards and notices directing the public to the yard, and the omnibuses being visible from the street - these omnibuses might not properly be said to be plying for hire in a street, but it is not necessary to decide that, and I postpone the expression of any opinion upon it.

JUDGMENTBY-3: ATKIN J

JUDGMENT-3:
ATKIN J: The appellants were charged under s. 45 of the Town Police Clauses Act, 1847, with having permitted an omnibus to be used as a hackney carriage standing or plying for hire within the borough of Walsall. The question arises what is the meaning of "hackney carriage" in that section. There is a definition of that expression in s. 38 of that Act, namely, "carriage used in standing or plying for hire in any street within the prescribed distance. But that definition has been extended by the Act of 1889, by s. 4 of which the expression "hackney carriage" is to include every "omnibus," which expression is in turn defined by s. 3 to include "every omnibus ... stage coach and other carriage plying or standing or hire by or used to carry passengers at separate fares to, from, or in any part of the prescribed distance." The result is that when considering whether a particular carriage comes within s. 45 you must not look at the definition of hackney carriage in s. 38 alone, but you must also look at the definition of omnibus in s. 3 of the later Act, and must read that in as included in the expression "hackney carriage" in s. 45; and in that definition of omnibus you have not got the element of standing or plying for hire "in a street." All we have to consider is whether this was an omnibus plying for hire within the prescribed distance; and if it was, then whether or not the proprietors were using it as an omnibus so plying for hire within that distance. I think the case clearly falls within the statute and that the conviction was right. There is one matter that I should like to refer to, though I express no opinion upon it; namely, whether, if this case had to be sent back for decision upon the question, it would not have been open to the magistrates to find that the appellants here were permitting their omnibus to be used for plying for hire in a street. In this case the magistrates have found the contrary. I only desire to say that in another case it appears to me that upon similar facts it might be possible for the magistrates to come to a different conclusion. The result is that the appeal will be dismissed.

DISPOSITION:
Appeal dismissed.

SOLICITORS:
Solicitor for appellants: Sydney Morse.

Solicitors for respondents: Davenport, [edited by admin] & Blake.
___________________________

CURTIS, APPELLANT v EMBERY, RESPONDENT

[EXCHEQUER]

[L R] 7 Exch 369

HEARING-DATES: 22 June 1872

22 June 1872

HEADNOTE:
In a district to which the Local Government Act, 1858, applied, a piece of ground adjoining a railway station, and belonging to the company, metalled and separated from the highway only by a gutter, was used as an approach to the railway station. Private carriages were allowed to stand there, but no hackney or public carriages, except those of the appellant; the appellant, by agreement with the company, having the sole right of standing carriages there for the purpose of plying for hire. The appellant having been convicted in a penalty for allowing his carriages to ply there for hire without a licence:-

Held, that the place was not a "street" within the meaning of s. 3 of the Towns Police Clauses Act, 1847 (10 & 11 Vict. c. 89), for that the places included by that section in the word "street" were places over which the public had a right of passage; and that the conviction was therefore wrong.

INTRODUCTION:
CASE stated by the Justices of Kent under 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43. The appellant was summoned under s. 45 of the Towns Police Clauses Act, 1847, for "permitting his carriage to be used as a hackney carriage plying for hire" within the limits of the Tunbridge Wells Improvement Act, without a licence.

The Local Government Act, 1858 20 & 21 Vict. c. 98, had been adopted in Tunbridge Wells. By virtue of orders made and confirmed under s. 77 of that Act, and by virtue of s. 20, all provisions of a local Act formerly in force there relating to hackney carriages had been repealed; but by s. 44, the provisions of the Towns Police Clauses Act, 1847, with respect to hackney carriages, are incorporated in the Local Government Act.

By the Towns Police Clauses Act, 1847 (10 & 11 Vict. c. 89) s. 45, a penalty is imposed on the proprietor of any carriage who "permits the same to be used as a hackney carriage plying for hire" without having obtained a licence under s. 37.

Sect. 38 defines a "hackney carriage" as "every wheeled carriage, whatever may be its form or construction, used in standing or plying for hire in any street within the prescribed distance."

By s. 3 "street" is to "extend to and include any road, square, court, alley, and thoroughfare, or public passage within the limits of the special Act."

By s. 2 of the Public Health Act, 1848 (11 & 12 Vict. c. 63, incorporated with the Local Government Act, 1858, by s. 4), the word "street" shall "apply to and include any highway (not being a turnpike road), and any road, public bridge (not being a county bridge), lane, footway, square, court, alley, passage, whether a thoroughfare or not, and the parts of any such highway, road, bridge, lane, footway, square, court, alley, or passage, within the limits of any district."

It was admitted that the carriage in question (being unlicensed) had plied for hire with the appellant's permission, but it was contended that it did not come within the definition of a hackney carriage in s. 38 of the Towns Police Clauses Act, 1847, inasmuch as it was not "standing or plying for hire in any street." The question therefore was, whether the place where it was standing was a "street" within the definition in s. 3 of the Towns Police Clauses Act, 1847; or, if that section was applicable, s. 2 of the Public Health Act, 1848 (11 & 12 Vict. c. 63).

The place where the carriage was standing is a piece of ground belonging to the South Eastern Railway Company, and situated between the public highway and the company's station. It is known to the police as the railway company's ground; it is metalled, and is only separated from the highway by a gutter. It is used as an approach to the railway station, and has always been kept in repair as a carriage-way by the company, who have permitted private carriages to stand upon it when waiting the arrival of the trains, but have forbidden hackney or public carriages, other than those of the appellant, to enter on the ground for the purpose of

plying for hire, and have prevented outside porters from standing thereon.

By agreement with the appellant, who is an hotel-keeper, the company have during the last seven years allowed him the sole right of standing carriages there for the purpose of being hired by railway passengers.

There was a separate approach for carriages to the other side of the station, which was inclosed. n(1)

The justices were of opinion that the place in question was a "street," and convicted the appellant.

COUNSEL:
Field, Q.C. (Murch with him), for the appellants, contended that the Public Health Act, 1848, s. 2, did not apply, but that if it did, the place in question, being private property, was not a "street" within the meaning of either Act, and cited Case v. Storey n(2) and Skinner v. Usher n(3) , decided under 1 & 2 Wm. 4, c. 22, and 6 & 7 Vict. c. 86, and distinguished Clarke v. Stanford n(4) , and Allen v. Tunbridge n(5) , as decided under the Metropolitan Public Carriage Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 115), s. 4, which only uses the words "plying for hire," but not the words "in any street or place."

R. E. Turner, for the respondent, contended that the present case was more analogous to the latter than to the former class of cases; that the place in question was at least a "road," and if so, then a "street" within the Towns Police Clauses Act, 1847, s. 3; and he referred to 5 & 6 Wm. 4, c. 50, s. 23, as using the word "road" in reference to a private way.

Field, Q.C., was not called on to reply.

PANEL: BRAMWELL, and CLEASBY, BB

JUDGMENTBY-1: BRAMWELL, B

JUDGMENT-1:
BRAMWELL, B: This conviction must be quashed. The reason of the thing, the words of the statute, and the authorities are all against it. The reason of this legislation is to protect the public who employ carriages plying for hire, where there is nothing to control the condition of the carriages and the conduct of the driver but his own discretion. But there was no intention to protect

them where the carriages and drivers are subject to the management of responsible persons, within whose private premises they stand to carry on their business. Therefore I think the legislature did not mean to include carriages plying for hire in the premises of the railway company, or where (as may happen) they ply for hire within the premises of the owner of the carriage.

It is said, however, that the place where this carriage was plying for hire was a road. But I think it was not a road nor any part of a road. A road as used in the Act of Parliament must manifestly mean a public road, a road which the public have a right to use for passage. This is so with all the places mentioned. They are all places of passage, and are all meant to be public. Otherwise a square which was not public, that is, the inclosure of a square, would be within the Act. I cannot think this is so; and am of opinion that the road spoken of must be a road over which the public have rights; and when we consider that the effect of affirming this conviction would be to make the Act apply to one platform and not to the other; and that the railway company might frustrate its effect by putting up a fence between their private property and the highway, it seems impossible to hold that the case is within the statute. Lastly, the decision in Case v. Storey n(1) is in point for the appellant.

JUDGMENTBY-2: CLEASBY, B

JUDGMENT-2:
CLEASBY, B: I am of the same opinion. The word "street" is dealt with in the interpretation clause of the Act of Parliament as extending to and including "any road, square, court, alley, and thoroughfare, or public passage," and it is said that this is a road. I think it is not. I will not attempt to define the definition in the interpretation clause; nor indeed do I know that I could define what a road is. But I will consider the facts to see if the place in question is within the meaning of the words as there used. [The learned judge referred to the statements of the case, and proceeded:-] The only passage which aids the contention that this is a road, is that which says it is used as an approach to the station. Now it is not contended that if this piece of land were inclosed it would be a road. But it appears that the railway company are entitled to prevent its being used by any person, and actually do prevent its being so used by all other persons; the use of it by the appellant is a special privilege granted to him. I can only say that these facts do not make the place a "road" in any sense within the Act.

DISPOSITION:
Judgment for the appellant.

SOLICITORS:
Attorney for appellant: E. P. Cearns.

Attorneys for respondent: Davidson, Carr, & Co.
_______________________________

SKINNER, APPELLANT; USHER, RESPONDENT

[QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION]

[L R] 7 QB 423

HEARING-DATES: 1 May 1872

1 May 1872

HEADNOTE:
By 6 & 7 Vict. c. 86, s. 33, a penalty is imposed on the driver of a hackney carriage who shall ply for hire elsewhere than at some standing appointed for the purpose:-

Held, that the plying for hire within this section must be in some public street or place; and that the driver of a hackney carriage, who plied for hire on an open unenclosed piece of private ground, to which the public had access, but over which there was no public right of way, was not within the section.

INTRODUCTION:
CASE stated by a Metropolitan Police Magistrate under 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43.

The appellant was a licensed driver of a hackney carriage, and appeared in answer to a summons which charged that the appellant did on, &c., at the parish of Putney, within the metropolitan police district, unlawfully ply for hire with the said hackney carriage elsewhere than at some standing or place appointed for that purpose.

The appellant is the servant of one Clipson, who is a cab proprietor and the occupier of a public-house situate in High Street, Putney, immediately opposite to the railway station of the London and South Western Railway there. In front of the principal entrance of the public-house, and between it and the main street, is a vacant piece of unenclosed ground, which is and has usually been for many years occupied with the public-house, and is open to the street and frequented by the public, but is private property and not subject to any right of passage by them.

Clipson has for many years been used to cause his cabs to stand upon this piece of unenclosed ground ready for the conveyance of passengers. On the day in question the appellant, by the orders of Clipson, was in charge of a licensed hackney carriage ready for the conveyance of passengers standing upon the piece of unenclosed ground. He was hailed by a person at or near the railway station, upon which he drove the carriage across the street and took up the person so hailing him, drove away, and, after an interval of about twenty minutes, returned and remained with the carriage upon the

piece of unenclosed ground ready for the conveyance of passengers as before.

No part of the piece of unenclosed ground has ever been appointed by any lawful authority as a standing whereon hackney carriages may ply for hire; but there is a place so lawfully appointed at a short distance from it in the High Street.

On behalf of the complainant, the respondent, it was contended that the facts above set forth were evidence of a breach of the provisions of 6 & 7 Vict. c. 86, s. 33.

On the part of the appellant it was contended that there was no evidence of any plying for hire at all; or that, if there was such evidence, there was no evidence of any plying for hire in a public street or place, and that in order to create a breach of the provisions of 6 & 7 Vict. c. 86, s. 33, there must be a plying for hire in a public street or place.

The magistrate convicted the appellant; the following being the grounds of his decision: 1st. That the appellant having his carriage ready for the conveyance of passengers in a place frequented by the public, was plying for hire, although the place was private property. 2nd. That it was not necessary, in order to constitute a breach of the provisions of 6 & 7 Vict. c. 86, s. 33, that there should be a plying for hire in a public street or place 3rd. That if it was so necessary, the facts above set forth disclose evidence on which the magistrate might lawfully find that there was a plying for hire in a public street or place.

If the Court should be of opinion that there was any evidence on which the magistrate could lawfully convict the appellant under 6 & 7 Vict. c. 86, s. 33, then the conviction was to be affirmed, otherwise it was to be quashed.

COUNSEL:
April 24. Edward Clarke, for the appellant. The conviction was under s. 33 of 6 & 7 Vict. c. 86, which subjects to a penalty "every driver of a hackney carriage who shall ply for hire elsewhere than at some standing or place appointed for that purpose, or while loitering, or by any wilful misbehaviour, shall cause any obstruction to or upon any public street, road, or place." This statute, by s. 3, extends the operation of 1 & 2 Wm. 4, c. 22, to the area of the metropolitan district, and the two Acts

must therefore be read together. By s. 4 of the earlier Act, hackney carriage is defined to be a carriage standing or plying for hire in any public street, or road, at any place within the distance of five miles from the Post Office; and in Case v. Storey n(1) it was held that this section overrode the other sections of the Act, and that consequently a carriage was not plying for hire within ss. 35 and 42, at a railway station, because it was not a public place, although the word "public" does not occur in those sections. A similar construction must be applied to s. 33 of the later Act, and "elsewhere" must mean elsewhere in a public road or place.

[QUAIN, J. In 6 & 7 Vict. c. 86, s. 2, the definition of hackney carriage is different from that in s. 4 of 1 & 2 Wm. 4, c. 22; it is, "every carriage which shall stand on hire, or ply for a passenger for hire, at any place within the limits of the city of London and metropolitan police district."]

Place must mean public place; the definition was not intended to alter the kind of place at which the plying for hire was to be, it was only intended to extend the area to which the Act should apply. "At any place," means that "any place" in s. 4 of the earlier Act, shall be extended to any place within the new limits, and the new definition must be read, plying for hire at any public street or road, at any place within the new limits. Clarke v. Stanford n(2) and Allen v. Tunbridge n(3) may be cited contra; but those cases were decided under s. 4, of 32 & 33 Vict. c. 115; and it may well be that a different construction should be put on that statute, as to the necessity of all carriages being licensed when plying for hire, whether in a public or private place, because, when hired, they ought to be under proper control wherever they happened to have been hired. But the present section applies not to the carriage, but to prevent the public thoroughfares from being crowded by hackney carriages plying for hire.

Sir J. D. Coleridge, A.G. (Archibald and Beasley with him), for the respondent. This piece of ground was a public place, being unenclosed and open to the public. But secondly, it need not be public to be within s. 33. There is a marked distinction between the sections of 1 & 2 Wm. 4, c. 22, under which Case v. Storey n(1) was decided, and the sections of 6 & 7 Vict. c. 86. In the first place the definition of "hackney carriage," in s. 2, omits all mention of "public road or street," and has only "at any place," and a precisely similar change in the phraseology of the Act was the ground of the decision in Clarke v. Stanford. n(2) Moreover, in the second branch of this very section as to loitering, public street, road, or place is used, shewing that in the first branch "public" was intentionally omitted, and "place" only used.

Clarke was heard in reply.

Cur. adv. vult.

May 1. The judgment of the Court (

PANEL: BLACKBURN, HANNEN and QUAIN, JJ

JUDGMENTBY-1: Blackburn,

JUDGMENT-1:
Blackburn, :

JUDGMENTBY-2: Hannen,

JUDGMENT-2:
Hannen, : and

JUDGMENTBY-3: Quain, JJ.

JUDGMENT-3:
Quain, JJ.: ) was delivered by

JUDGMENTBY-4: BLACKBURN, J.

JUDGMENT-4:
BLACKBURN, J.: [After stating the facts.] We think the magistrate was right in his first finding, that the appellant was plying for hire. The second question is, whether he was within s. 33 of 6 & 7 Vict. c. 86, and was liable to a penalty for "plying for hire elsewhere than at some standing or place appointed for the purpose." It is obvious that, if the appellant was liable to a penalty, any cab-driver waiting to take up passengers at a railway station would be equally liable. We, however, think that the legislature did not intend to prohibit such a plying for hire. The previous Act was 1 & 2 Wm. 4, c. 22, by s. 4 of which it is enacted, that "every carriage with two or more wheels, which shall be used for the purpose of standing or plying for hire in any public street or road, at any place within the distance of five miles from the General Post Office, in the city of London ... shall be deemed and taken to be a hackney carriage within the meaning of this Act." In Case v. Storey n(1) it was held that "any street or place," in s. 35 of that Act, must be read with reference to s. 4, and that s. 35 therefore applied only to a carriage standing in a public place, and did not apply to a cab standing on the private ground of a railway station; and that decision we think quite right, and that that Act did not intend to interfere with a carriage plying for hire on private ground.

That Act was confined to five miles from the General Post Office. Then came 6 & 7 Vict. c. 86, under which this conviction took place, which is in pari materie, and must be read together with 1 & 2 Wm. 4, c. 22. It, at first sight, certainly seems to vary the definition of "hackney carriage," which (by s. 2) "shall include every carriage (except a stage carriage) which shall stand on hire or ply for a passenger for hire at any place within the limits of the city of London and the liberties thereof, and the metropolitan police district." Whereas the first Act defines "hackney carriage" as any carriage standing or plying for hire in any public street or road, at any place within five miles of the Post-Office, the second Act extends the definition to any carriage standing or plying for hire at any place within the metropolitan police district. We think, however, on the true construction of the later Act, that it was not intended by this alteration to alter the definition or the nature of the place wherein the plying for hire should take place, simply because it says "at any place," instead of "in any public street or road at any place;" but the intention was merely to extend the limits to the whole metropolitan police district instead of within five miles of the Post-Office; and that the same kind of place was still intended, viz., any public street or road at any place within the extended area. If that be so, and the definition in the two Acts of "hackney carriage" be the same, then the same interpretation must be put on s. 33 of the later Act as was put on s. 35 of the other Act; and the driver of a hackney carriage would only be liable to a penalty for plying for hire elsewhere, that is, in some public place other than on an appointed standing; and if he be not plying for hire in a public place he would not be within the section: so that cabs waiting for passengers at a railway station would not be within the Act, and neither would the ground on which the appellant's carriage stood be "elsewhere" within the meaning of the Act, not being public ground. This construction of the Act is confirmed by reference to ss. 30 and 32. In s. 32 "place" must mean "public place," streets, and roads, or thoroughfares; and so in s. 30 a standing is not to be appointed except in the centre part of the street, unless in the case of a street with houses only on one side of it, seeming to indicate that the commissioners can only appoint standings in public streets. Though it might be read, no doubt, to mean that when they appoint a standing in a street it shall only be in the centre of it. It appears

clear, however, to us that the legislature was only, in s. 33, contemplating a plying for hire in a public place, and that as a driver of a hackney carriage was not bound under the first Act to accept a fare when plying for hire not in a public place, so under the other Act he would not be liable to penalty for plying for hire in the same place. We cannot believe that the legislature intended, in 6 & 7 Vict. c. 86, by a mere sidewind to put an end to the practice of cabs standing for hire at railway stations.

It was said that the construction we are prepared to put on the Act would give an unfair advantage to the owners of private ground; but we do not think the legislature can be supposed, when making regulations for hackney carriages, to have intended to place every person who happened to be a cabowner on an equal footing. The Act was passed alio intuitu.

Then it was argued that the case of Clarke v. Stanford n(1) was an authority against this construction of the Act. But that case is quite consistent with our present decision, and was quite right on the construction of the Act there in question. That case turned on 32 & 33 Vict. c. 115, and the definition of hackney carriage in that Act was quite different from the present; for after saying that the limits of the Act shall be the metropolitan police district and the city of London, and after defining "stage carriage" as "any carriage for the conveyance of passengers which plies for hire in any public street, road, or place within the limits of this Act," the Act proceeds to define "hackney carriage" as meaning "any carriage for the conveyance of passengers, which plies for hire within the limits of this Act, not being a stage carriage," purposely making the distinction between stage carriage and hackney carriage, and in the definition of the latter omitting "public place."

The appellant, therefore, who was not plying for hire in a public street or road, was not plying "elsewhere" than at an appointed standing, within the clause.

DISPOSITION:
Judgment for the appellant.

SOLICITORS:
Attorney for appellant: Willoughby.

Attorneys for respondents: Solicitors to Treasury.
______________________

ALLEN, APPELLANT; TUNBRIDGE, RESPONDENT

[COURT OF COMMON PLEAS]

[L R] 6 C P 481

HEARING-DATES: 6 June 1871

6 June 1871

HEADNOTE:
A brougham, the owner of which, by agreement with a railway company, attends at their station to await the arrival of trains for the conveyance of any passenger by the railway who chooses to hire it, and whose driver solicits passengers, is a "hackney-carriage plying for hire" within the meaning of s. 4 of the Metropolitan Public Carriage Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 115).

Clarke v. Stanford (Law Rep. 6 Q. B. 357), followed.

INTRODUCTION:
CASE stated by the Lord Mayor of London for the opinion of the Court, under 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43.

Upon the hearing of an information preferred by the appellant, an inspector of the Metropolitan police, against the respondent, charging that he, on the 23rd of June, 1870, was the owner and

driver of an unlicensed hackney-carriage which unlawfully plied for hire at the Cannon Street railway station, contrary to the Metropolitan Public Carriage Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 115), s. 7, the same was dismissed.

It was proved or admitted that the respondent was the owner of a four-wheeled carriage of the class usually called "broughams," which carriage he, dressed after the manner of a private coachman, himself drove; that the respondent's carriage had no distinguishing mark or numbered plate such as licensed hackney-carriages ought to have, and presented the appearance of a private carriage; that the South Eastern Railway Company allowed the proprietors of certain carriages, both of the class known as "cabs" and of the class usually called "broughams," the right or privilege of coming into the railway station at Cannon Street, and of standing such cabs and broughams by the arrival platform in the interior of such station for the purpose of being hired, the said station in Cannon Street (where the alleged offence is stated to have been committed) being the property of the South Eastern Railway Company, to which the general public have no right of access except when arriving or departing as passengers by the railway; that the respondent, being allowed snch privilege from the company, on the day in question placed or stood his brougham alongside the arrival-platform in the interior of the station, and spoke to two several passengers who had arrived by train, his object being to get his carriage hired, but that neither passenger engaged him; and that the railway company so allowed the respondent to stand his carriage in their station, for the purpose of accommodating some of their passengers who desired a better class of carriage than those known as "cabs."

It was contended for the appellant that the respondent's carriage was a hackney-carriage within the meaning of the statutes; that there was a "plying for hire" within s. 7 of 32 & 33 Vict. c. 115, although the plying for hire was within the railway station; that the definition of a hackney-carriage given by s. 4 of 32 & 33 Vict. c. 115 is, that it is "a carriage for the conveyance of passengers, which plies for hire within the limits of the Act," without adding, as in the definition given in the same section of a stage-carriage, "in any public street, road, or place;" that, the statute

having been passed subsequently to the decision of the Court of Exchequer in Case v. Storey n(1) , the legislature must be presumed to have intentionally omitted the words, "in any public street, road, or place," from the definition of a hackney-carriage in consequence of that decision; and that, if it was necessary for the appellant, in order to support the information, to prove that the respondent's carriage was plying in a public place, the railway station was such a public place within the meaning of the Act.

For the respondent it was contended that the respondent's carriage was not a "hackney-carriage" within the meaning of the statutes; that the Hackney Carriage Acts do not extend to a railway station, which is private property; and that there was no "plying for hire" within the terms of s. 7 of 32 & 33 Vict. c. 115.

The Lord Mayor was of opinion that the contention of the respondent was the correct one; that the evidence and admissions did not shew that any offence had been committed; and that according to the judgment in Case v. Storey n(1) , - there being no interpretation-clause in the statute, - the words "plying for hire" could not apply to a standing or plying for hire under the circumstances of this case.

The opinion of the Court was requested as to whether the respondent ought to have been convicted.

COUNSEL:
F. M. White, for the appellant. The respondent's brougham was clearly a hackney-carriage, and he was "plying for hire" within the meaning of 32 & 33 Vict. c. 115, ss. 4, 7. The point was expressly decided by the Court of Queen's Bench in Clarke v. Stanford n(2) , where it was held that a carriage, whilst on the premises of a railway company under a contract with them to await the arrival of their trains, for the conveyance of any passenger by railway who chooses to hire it, is plying for hire within the meaning of the Act. Case v. Storey n(1) , which, however, turned upon an earlier statute n(3) , was there referred to. The facts of the present case are even stronger than those of that case.

Field, Q.C. (Willis with him), for the respondent. Looking at the whole tenor of the Act now in question, this is not a hackney-carriage within it, nor was the respondent plying for hire in any public place.

There is no difference in principle between this case and a hiring upon the premises of a job-master. The recent statute never could have intended by implication to alter the definition of a plying for hire under the former Act, as construed by the Court of Exchequer in Case v. Storey. n(1) It was clearly meant to apply to carriages plying for hire in the street, under circumstances which made it compulsory on them to take any fare that might be offered them. The judgment of the Lord Chief Baron is extremely strong.

White, in reply. That which was done here would, if done in a public street, clearly have been a plying for hire, which means soliciting custom without any previous contract. After the decision in Case v. Storey n(1) , it cannot be contended that a railway-station is a "public street or place:" but the recent statute applies to a plying for hire in any place within the limits of "the metropolitan police district and the city of London and liberties thereof." [The cases of Re Painter n(2) , and Booking v. Jones n(3) were also referred to.]

PANEL: WILLES, KEATING, and MONTAGUE SMITH, JJ

JUDGMENTBY-1: WILLES, J

JUDGMENT-1:
WILLES, J: Without saying what my opinion would have been but for the recent case in the Court of Queen's Bench, I feel much impressed with the importance of having concurrent decisions upon the construction of Acts of Parliament; and I therefore come to the conclusion that the appellant in this case is entitled to judgment. Clarke v. Stanford n(4) is precisely in point; and indeed there are some circumstances in this case which give even greater reason for holding that there was a plying for hire here than there. It was assumed in that case that the words "in any public street, road, or place" were omitted from s. 4 of 32 & 33 Vict. c. 115 by reason of the decision in Case v. Storey n(1) that those words did not include a railway-station. A cab does not become any other than a hackney-carriage though plying for hire in a railway-station. I do not wish to throw any doubt upon the decision of the Court of Queen's Bench; but, if the matter were new, it might be worth while to consider whether a hackney-carriage might not be a stage-carriage if passengers were carried at separate fares, and so brought by implication within the earlier part of s. 4 of the Act. But I do not feel the necessity for that implication here. I rather incline to follow authority.

It must, I think, be taken that the vehicle in this case, if it had been a cab, would have been a hackney-carriage within s. 4. As to plying for hire, this is a stronger case than that in the Queen's Bench. There, without expressing it in words, the man was understood to be ready to be hired by any passenger coming by the trains. Here, there was an actual solicitation of two persons to hire the carriage. Founding my judgment entirely upon the case in the Queen's Bench, I am of opinion that the respondent ought to have been convicted.

JUDGMENTBY-2: KEATING, J

JUDGMENT-2:
KEATING, J: , concurred.

JUDGMENTBY-3: MONTAGUE SMITH, J

JUDGMENT-3:
MONTAGUE SMITH, J: I am of the same opinion upon the authority of the case in the Queen's Bench. It appears to have been held there, that, if the proprietor of a carriage sends it to a place for the purpose of picking up passengers, that is a plying for hire within the Act. That is very different from a customer going to a job-master to hire a carriage. I rest my judgment also entirely upon the case of Clarke v. Stanford. n(1)

DISPOSITION:
Judgment for the appellant.

SOLICITORS:
Attorneys for appellant: Ellis & Ellis.

Attorney for respondent: Cearns.

______________________________________

CLARKE AND GOODGE, APPELLANTS; STANFORD, RESPONDENT

[QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION]

[L R] 6 QB 357

HEARING-DATES: 29 April 1871

29 April 1871

HEADNOTE:
A carriage, whilst on the premises of a railway company, under a contract with them to await the arrival of their trains, for the conveyance of any passenger by railway who chooses to hire it, is plying for hire within the meaning of the Metropolitan Public Carriage Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 115), s. 4; and is therefore a hackney carriage, and must be licensed.

INTRODUCTION:
CASE stated by Justices of Middlesex under 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43.

The information charged that F. G. Clarke did unlawfully ply for hire, with an unlicensed carriage, at Harrow railway station, contrary to 32 & 33 Vict. c. 115, s. 7, and that S. Goodge did unlawfully act as driver of an unlicensed hackney carriage at Harrow railway station, contrary to the same section.

The following facts were proved:-

The London and North Western Railway Company have a station at Harrow, within the limits of the Metropolitan Police District, which are those also of the Metropolitan Public Carriage Act, 1869, (32 & 33 Vict. c. 115). The yard in front of the station is enclosed, and is their private property. The appellant Clarke is a livery

stable keeper. The railway company had, upon certain terms, arranged with the appellant to supply certain broughams, flies, and carriages, part of the terms being that the vehicles should stand on the premises of the company within the yard to await the arrival of passengers by the trains. The appellants' servants who drove the flies were instructed not to invite passengers by speech, but to wait until called by a servant of the company, or hired by the passenger himself. When so called, the person requiring the fly entered, and was driven according to his own directions and paid the fare.

It was contended by the respondent that a fly so used was within s. 4 of the Metropolitan Public Carriage Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 115), which defines a hackney carriage to be "any carriage for the conveyance of passengers which plies for hire within the limits of this Act, and is not a stage carriage," and, therefore, required to be licensed, and to observe the regulations prescribed by that Act.

It was contended on behalf of the appellants that, inasmuch as the fly was in the private yard of the railway company, it was not "plying for hire" within the meaning of the statute.

The justices were of opinion that the fly, while waiting in the yard of the railway station, was, in fact, "plying for hire" within the meaning of the definition of a hackney carriage in s. 4 of 32 & 33 Vict. c. 115; and were of opinion that the fact that the driver was ready to take up any passenger coming by rail as a fare was sufficient, and that the circumstance that the yard was enclosed, and that other hackney carriages were not allowed there, was of no moment, and they therefore convicted the appellants.

The question for the opinion of the Court was whether such construction of the statute is right.

COUNSEL:
Bosanquet, for the appellants. The conviction cannot be supported. The carriage was not "plying for hire" within the meaning of s. 4. Plying for hire is a plying for hire generally; here the fly was waiting for a particular class of persons, and could not be hired by any one of the public. If Case v. Storey n(1) is rightly decided, there was no plying for hire, Kelly, C.B., in his judgment, says: "Plying for hire must mean that the carriage is to be at the disposal of any one of the public who may think fit to hire it." That case was decided on a different statute, but that part of the judgment is in point. If the carriage was in the private yard of an hotel keeper, or waiting on the premises of a gentleman, it could not be said to be plying for hire; here it is waiting in the private yard of a railway company.

F. M. White, for the respondent, was not heard.

PANEL: COCKBURN, C.J., MELLOR and LUSH, JJ

JUDGMENTBY-1: COCKBURN, C.J

JUDGMENT-1:
COCKBURN, C.J: I think this case is clearly within the statute. The owner and driver of this carriage were rightly convicted, as the carriage was plying for hire. In Case v. Storey n(1) , the question turned upon a different statute, and the decision was that under that statute there must be a plying for hire in a public place; this case is therefore not governed by that decision. The words of the present statute, "plying for hire," are satisfied by the facts which exist in the present case. Carriages are admitted within the premises of the railway company at Harrow under a contract, by which they engage to convey any passengers who come by railway, and although it is not expressly so found in the case, yet it is clear that the appellants' carriages are exclusively for the use of passengers who come by the railway.

I assume that the use of the carriage is confined to the purposes of the passengers coming by railway; still that is a plying for hire. The case put by Mr. Bosanquet, of a carriage being on a man's own premises ready to go out if required, is not what can be understood as "plying for hire" within the meaning of this Act. But where a person has a carriage ready for the conveyance of passengers, in a place frequented by the public, he is plying for hire, although the place is private property. The public is entitled to travel by railway, and has a right to pass over the premises of the railway to get out, and if a man is standing on those premises with his carriage to take the public, he is plying for hire. The legislature has omitted the words "public place," and this appears to have been done intentionally and advisedly. I think the facts shew that there was a plying for hire within the statute, and the carriage was therefore a hackney carriage within the statute.

JUDGMENTBY-2: MELLOR, J

JUDGMENT-2:
MELLOR, J: In a certain sense, the place where the carriage was standing was private property, and the railway company could exclude cabs from coming there. Case v. Storey n(1) does not apply. Under the statute on which that case was decided, a hackney carriage was defined as a carriage used for the purpose of standing or plying for hire in any public street or road. In the present Act the words "public street or road" are omitted, and this is a carriage for the conveyance of passengers, which plies for hire within the meaning of 32 & 33 Vict. c. 115. It is said that there is no plying for hire because the carriage is admitted on the railway premises, under certain regulations; that is, it is only to carry persons who come by train. But what is the carriage there for? though the driver makes no sign, he is there to be hired by persons who arrive by train, and there is no restriction as to the persons who, arriving by train, shall hire the carriage: it is therefore plying for hire, within the meaning of the statute.

JUDGMENTBY-3: LUSH, J

JUDGMENT-3:
LUSH, J: I am of the same opinion. It is no longer necessary that a hackney carriage, to be "plying for hire," should be in a public street. The recent statute, 32 & 33 vict. c. 115, has dropped these words. This carriage was awaiting the arrival of a train, in order to be hired by any person who might come by the train. That is a plying for hire, within the meaning of this statute.

DISPOSITION:
Judgment for the respondent.

SOLICITORS:
Attorney for appellants; Venn.

Attorneys for respondent: Ellis & Ellis.
_________________________________

CASE, APPELLANT; STOREY, RESPONDENT

[EXCHEQUER]

[L R] 4 Exch 319

HEARING-DATES: 31 May 1869

31 May 1869

HEADNOTE:
A hackney carriage whilst on the premises of a railway company by their leave for the accommodation of passengers by their trains, is not "plying for hire" in any "street or place" within the meaning of the Hackney Carriage Acts, and the driver of such carriage cannot under those acts be compelled to convey any person desirous of hiring it.

Semble (per Bramwell, B.), if the driver consents to be hired, the regulations of the Hackney Carriage Acts as to the amount of fare payable will attach.

INTRODUCTION:
CASE stated by a Metropolitan Police Magistrate under 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43.

A complaint was preferred by the appellant against the respondent

that the respondent, the driver of the hackney carriage No. 3435, did in a certain public place, to wit, the Great Northern railway station at King's Cross, in the parish of St. Pancras, and within the metropolitan police district, refuse to drive the said carriage to a certain place, not exceeding six miles, to which he was required to drive the appellant. The following facts were proved at the hearing:-

The appellant went to the Great Northern Railway station, within which, on a rank of cabs by the side of the arrival platform, was the respondent's cab. The respondent had been admitted into the station with his cab by the railway company, for the purpose of accommodating passengers arriving by their trains. The station is the private property of the company. The appellant who had not on the occasion in question been a passenger by any train, but had entered the company's premises from the street, required the respondent, whom he found standing on the arrival platform near the cab, to drive him to Camden Town (a place less than six miles off), but upon learning that the appellant had not arrived by train, the respondent declined to drive him.

This was the offence complained of. On the part of the appellant it was contended that the respondent was bound to drive him, and in refusing made himself liable to a penalty under 1 & 2 Wm. 4, c. 22, ss. 35, 42, and 16 & 17 Vict. c. 33, s. 17. The respondent, on the other hand, urged that the Great Northern railway station was private property, and that he and all other cabmen who entered the station to take passengers were either hired by the company, or, at all events, were on private ground under the company's license, and not in any "street or place," and could not be said to be "plying for hire" within the meaning of the Hackney Carriage Acts. The magistrate determined that a railway station bei

So why is it, if a York taxi [anyone who knows the layout] who doesn't have a permit who drops off on the public area parallell with the taxi rank, which is divided by paving stones, cannot pick up a hire, every body else, business and private cars is picking up everybody else, but taxi without permit can't

Jeez JD....you must have a spare room full of paper.

I think Manchester Airport would have had a decent use for half that lot you posted!

regards

CC

_________________
Think of how stupid the average person is, and realize half of them are stupider than that.
George Carlin

I think the taxi trade is all the richer for the information this site provides, don't you?

Regards

JD

The last time I was at york station which was several years ago, you could drive directly onto the forecourt from the main road, I don't know what the situation is now but the rank was on the forecourt and that is station property. Picking up on station property without a plying for hire permit is an offence. Obviuosly picking up on a public highway is not an offence.

Regards

JD

I think the information avalable is extremely useful

regards

CC

_________________
Think of how stupid the average person is, and realize half of them are stupider than that.
George Carlin

I think the taxi trade is all the richer for some of the information this site provides,?


On this point I sincerely agree

_________________
Justice for the 96. It has only taken 27 years...........repeat the same lies for 27 years and the truth sounds strange to people!

What I should have said was, where a station permit scheme is in force then plying for hire without permission is a station bylaw offence. This ofcourse would not apply to a pre booked fare standing on station property.

Regards

JD

Interesting , but what happens , if it is a designated hackney stand on station property.?

_________________
Justice for the 96. It has only taken 27 years...........repeat the same lies for 27 years and the truth sounds strange to people!

It doesn't make any difference, if you havent got permission from the station to use it, then it is an offence under their bylaws if you do use it.

I posted these particular bylaws several years ago in a seperate discussion so they should be on here.

Regards

JD

York stn rank is not designated or even listed in the Council list of approved hackney carriage ranks
The byelaw No9 clearly states clearly that in between the hours of 0700 to 1900hrs a hackney carriage must go to a designated Council taxi rank, if that rank is full, go to the next nearest one, yet a 100 plus cabs don't obey that byelaw.

the stn hack rank is surveyed by the Council as all otherCouncil ranks are, the details of met and unmet demands of the stn rank are still listed and used in the total survey results to come to a conclusion

Well that's this years bandwidth gone.

_________________
IDFIMH

That byelaw is universal and outdated and it should be removed. That is an item that this meetings of minds bunch should have addressed instead of trying to stitch up hackney carriage drivers.

Regards

JD

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