Taxi Driver Online

DEREK FULTON Appellant

against

ROBERT FERGUSON LEES Respondent(Procurator Fiscal, Edinburgh) 1992 S.C.C.R. 923

Stated Case

Appeal Court, High Court of Justiciary

29th September 1992

Statutory offence—Airports byelaws—Roads to which road traffic enactments apply excluded from power to make byelaws regulating traffic—Byelaw prohibiting offering things for hire without permission—Whether applicable to taxi playing for hire on road in airport to which road traffic enactments apply—Airports Act 1986 (c.31), s.63(2)(d)—Scottish Airports Byelaws 1986, byelaw 5(14) Appeal—Stated case—Grounds not included in application for stated case—Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975 (c.21), s.452(3)—Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1980 (c.62), Sched.3, para.11 Words—'Airport'

Section 63(2)(d) of the Airports Act 1986 provides that byelaws made by an airport operator may include byelaws for regulating vehicular traffic anywhere in the airport except on roads to which the road traffic enactments apply. Byelaw 5(14) of the Scottish Airports Byelaws 1986 prohibits the offering of things for hire or of services without the permission of the operator.

The appellant was charged with a breach of byelaw 5(14) in that he had picked up a fare in his taxi at Edinburgh Airport without having permission to do so. At his trial he argued that as the place where he had picked up the fare was a road to which the road traffic enactments applied, the application of the byelaw was excluded by s.63(2)(d) of the Act. The sheriff rejected this argument and convicted the appellant, who appealed to the High Court by stated case. He argued further in the appeal that the road in question was not part of the airport, which was defined as an 'aerodrome', and accordingly should be limited to the runway.

Held (1) that 'the airport' must include the landing ground, the terminal building and the curtilage, and that in any event the sheriff had found that Edinburgh Airport Ltd were the proprietors of the lands on which the airport was situated, including the road in question (p.929B-D); and

(2) that the exclusion of roads to which the road traffic enactments applied extended only to byelaws purporting to regulate vehicular traffic, and did not extend to byelaw 5(14) (p.931C-E); and appeal refused.

Case referred to in the opinion of the court:

Cinnamond v British Airports Authority [1980] 1 W.L.R. 582; [1980] 2 All E.R. 368; [1979] R.T.R. 331.

Derek Fulton was charged on summary complaint in the sheriff court at Edinburgh that:

'[O]n 30th January 1990 at Edinburgh Airport, Jubilee Road, District of Edinburgh, you did offer for hire a taxi without the permission of the British Airports Authority and without other lawful authority or excuse: contrary to the Scottish Airports Byelaws 1986, section [sic] 5(14) and the Airports Act 1986, section 64.'

Evidence was led in his trial on 10th April 1991 and on 22nd April 1991 he was convicted. He appealed to the High Court by stated case, the matters desired to bring under review being:

'(a) That the sheriff erred in law in holding that in the circumstances of the case the appellant offered his taxi for hire.

(b) That the sheriff erred in law in rejecting the submission on behalf of the appellant that the offence was not relevantly libelled in terms of the Scottish Airports Byelaws 1986, section [sic] 5(14), and the Airports Act 1986, section 64, and that the offence ought more properly to have been libelled in terms of section [sic] 8(1) of said byelaws.

(c) That the sheriff erred in law in repelling the submission on behalf of the appellant that a prosecution in terms of section [sic] 8(1) of said byelaws would have been incompetent as ultra vires in respect that the byelaw enacted by said [byelaws] goes beyond enabling powers in the principal Act of Parliament and is also repugnant to the general law.'

In her note the sheriff (Poole) stated, inter alia:

'Section 64(1) of the Airports Act 1986 provided that:

'“Any person contravening any byelaws made under section 63 shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine. . . .”

'Section 63(1) of the Act provided that:

'“[T]he airport operator . . . may make byelaws for regulating the use and operation of the airport and the conduct of all persons while within the airport.”

'By section 63(2) it is provided that:

'“Any such byelaws may, in particular, include byelaws—. . .

(d) for regulating vehicular traffic anywhere within the airport, except on roads within the airport to which the road traffic enactments apply, and in particular (with that exception) for imposing speed limits on vehicles within the airport and for restricting or regulating the parking of vehicles or their use for any purpose or in any manner specified in the byelaws;

(e) for prohibiting waiting by hackney carriages except at standings appointed by such persons as may be specified in the byelaws;

(f) for prohibiting or restricting access to any part of the airport; . . .”

'The Scottish Airports Byelaws 1986, which were made under the authority of the Airports Act 1986, by byelaw 5(14) provide that:

'“No person shall sell or distribute anything, offer anything for sale or hire or make any offer of services.”

'Much of the evidence in this case was not really disputed.

'Mr Fulton is a taxi driver and holds a licence from Edinburgh District Council's licensing authority to operate a taxi within the district of Edinburgh area. He operates one of the distinctive Edinburgh black hackney “London cab” style taxis.

'At about 9.30 a.m. on 30th January 1990 he drove a customer to Edinburgh Airport and then dropped him off in Jubilee Road outside the terminal buildings.

'Mr Fulton was about to drive away when a Mr Powell, an English businessman, approached him and requested what the fare would be to take him to Kirkcaldy. Mr Fulton checked with a printed list and stated that it would be £25, at which point Mr Powell indicated that he accepted that and climbed into the taxi. Mr Fulton then made some sort of remark that he was not supposed to look for fares at the airport and Mr Powell replied that Mr Fulton had not looked for him. It was he, Mr Powell, who had looked for Mr Fulton.

'At that time there were taxis in the airport taxi rank some yards ahead of where Mr Fulton had left his original fare and Mr Powell had spoken to him. At the head of the queue of waiting airport taxis was a taxi driven by Mr Little and, immediately behind him, was one driven by Mr Niall Brown. Both Mr Little and Mr Brown operate their taxis by plying for hire in and out of Edinburgh Airport. They have permission to do so from Edinburgh Airport Ltd.

'In order to have that permission they require not only to be licensed by the local authority, just as Mr Fulton requires to be, but also to pay Edinburgh Airport Ltd the sum of some £875 + V.A.T. annually. Edinburgh Airport Ltd also require these “airport taxis” to be of the saloon type.

'Over some years various arrangements have been made between Edinburgh Airport Ltd, and its predecessors in title, and Edinburgh District Council, as the licensing authority, for the provision of taxis at Edinburgh Airport. The present system in operation was outlined in a letter written by Mr Smith, the Manager Airport Operation of Edinburgh Airport Ltd, on 18th December 1989. It was accepted that that was the situation operating on 30th January 1990.

'“City cabs may uplift at the airport only where there is a queue at the taxi stance and there are no airport cars in the rank to service the queue. . . .

'“If there is a passenger waiting and an airport taxi is available it is the airport taxi's fare.”

'It was also accepted that Edinburgh Airport Ltd gave permission for drivers of city cabs like Mr Fulton to set down passengers and to uplift them when they had been pre-booked.

'What, so it was contended, under the byelaws and section [sic] 5(14) in particular, Mr Fulton and other drivers like him were prohibited from doing was to ply for hire, wait on the airport taxi rank or cruise round with their light on indicating that they were available for hire. . . .

'The first issue between the parties was that, esto the airport byelaws were valid, it was not Mr Fulton who had offered his taxi for hire but the offer had come from Mr Powell and was accepted by Mr Fulton.

'That argument had its attractions, but in my view that initial approach by Mr Powell was more in the nature of preliminary negotiations to the eventual concluded bargain. . . .

'I concluded therefore that the evidence supported the crucial fact that he had offered the hire of his taxi to Mr Powell for the journey to Kirkcaldy. . . .

'So that it would follow that if those byelaws were properly made, Mr Fulton was in breach of them.

'The main issue between the parties was whether the prosecution was competent or not. . . .

'Mr Belmonte [solicitor for the accused] contended that there was nothing in [the] list [in s.63(2)] which could make byelaw 5(14) intra vires with the exception of section 63(2)(d), and section 63(2)(d), he contended, could not be used to give such authority to the byelaws since its terms excluded roads to which road traffic enactments applied, and, on the evidence, Jubilee Road was one to which road traffic enactments applied.

'The Crown in reply contended that the list was not exclusive. Section 63(1) provided first that:

'“[T]he airport operator . . . may make byelaws for regulating the use and operation of the airport and the conduct of all persons while within the airport.”

'I think the only clear meaning of that wording linked with the wording of section 63(2), “Any such byelaws may, in particular, include”, is that the list which follows is not exclusive so that, providing the Crown has established that the byelaw falls within the ambit of the words, “for regulating the use and operation of the airport and the conduct of all persons while within the airport”, the byelaws will have been competently made.

'As Sachs J. said in Commissioners of Customs and Excise v Cure and Deeley Ltd [1962] 1 Q.B. 340 at p.367; [1961] 3 W.L.R. 798; [1961] 3 All E.R. 641:

'“To my mind a court is bound before reaching a decision on the question whether a regulation is intra vires to examine the nature, objects, and scheme of the piece of legislation as a whole, and in the light of that examination to consider exactly what is the area over which powers are given by the section under which the competent authority is purporting to act.”

'And as the late Professor Mitchell pointed out, in his Constitutional Law (2nd edn), at p.238:

'“By-laws must be intra vires; those words mean not merely that the by-law must be within the terms of the authorising statute, but also that the power is exercised for the proper purposes, and not for collateral ones.”

'I think that there can be little doubt but that the provisions of byelaw 5(14) . . . are for “regulating the use and operation of the airport and the conduct of all persons while within the airport”.

'I have therefore concluded that byelaw 5(14) of the Scottish Airports Byelaws 1986 was competently made.

'I was fortified in reaching that decision by the decision in Cinnamond v British Airports Authority, a decision of the English Court of Appeal, and by the older, Scottish House of Lords case of Perth General Station Committee v Ross (1897) 24 R.45. . . .

'In Cinnamond, six minicab drivers were served with notices prohibiting them entering London Heathrow Airport under byelaws made under section 9 of the Airports Authority Act 1975—many of which provisions were directly re-enacted under section 63 of the 1986 Act.

'Section 9(1) of the 1975 Act provided:

'“That Authority may . . . make byelaws for regulating the use and operation of the aerodrome and the conduct of persons while within the aerodrome. . . .”

'It was held that a byelaw made under that provision providing that:

'“No person shall enter the aerodrome except as a bona fide airline passenger whilst having been prohibited from entering by an authorised officer of the company” was valid.

'One of the cases referred to in Cinnamond was the Scottish case of Perth General Station Committee v Ross. . . .

'Finally, an issue arose as to whether, given the terms of section 63(2)(d) of the Act, the byelaw was applicable to Jubilee Road.

'Section 63(2)(d) provides that the authority may make byelaws for regulating vehicular traffic “anywhere within the airport, except on roads . . . to which the road traffic enactments apply. . .”.

'Jubilee Road is a road to which road traffic enactments apply, according to the evidence of Inspector Elgin, in that, as it is a road to which the public have access, the drink driving legislation, for instance, would apply to it.

'I found this somewhat more difficult. If Mr Belmonte's contentions were correct, where vehicular traffic was concerned in Jubilee Road, section 63(2)(e) concerning the waiting of hackney carriages and a large number of the safety provisions in section 63(2) would, arguably, be inapplicable, not only to Jubilee Road but to other parts of the airport. That I concluded could not have been the intention of Parliament.

'I took the view that the intention of the wording of section 63(2)(d) was to regulate, ab ante, any conflict with, for instance, the drink driving parliamentary legislation and, further, to make statutory provision for any derogation from the powers and duties of Edinburgh Airports Ltd laid down by statute or by common law in a specific legislative framework where there could be seen to be future conflict. In so construing section 63(2)(d) I followed the approach to statutory construction in Cinnamond. . . .'

The question for the opinion of the High Court was:

'On the foregoing facts admitted or proved, was I entitled to find the appellant guilty?'

The appeal was first heard on 17th December 1991 by the Lord Justice-Clerk (Ross), Lord Morison and Lord Weir, when it was continued to enable counsel to obtain instructions. The Lord Justice-Clerk subsequently issued the following note:

'On 17th December 1991 when this appeal called before the court Mr Stewart [counsel for the appellant] intimated that he had five principal submissions to make:

(1) The complaint libelled a contravention of byelaws, and byelaws which do not have statutory effect do not prove themselves. He contended that there was no finding that any particular document is an authoritative copy of the byelaws in question.

(2) The complaint libelled a lack of permission from B.A.A. and there was no finding to that effect.

(3) Esto the byelaws had been proved, lack of lawful authority or excuse is part of the substantive defence, which it is for the prosecutor to prove, and there was no relevant finding to that effect.

(4) Esto it was for the appellant to establish excuse, on the facts found such excuse had been established.

(5) In any event, on a proper construction of the byelaws no offence under the byelaws was shown to have been committed on the facts of the case.

'The application for the stated case appears [in] the print, and it is there specified what matters are desired to be brought under review. Mr Stewart eventually conceded that with the exception of the submission (5) none of his submissions were covered by the matters sought to be brought under review in the application for the stated case. Mr Stewart's attention was then drawn to section 452(3) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975. He was asked if he could show cause as to why the appellant should be allowed to found any aspect of his appeal on a matter not contained in his application for a stated case, and he was unable to satisfy the court that such cause could be shown. The court accordingly intimated that it was not prepared to hear argument from Mr Stewart on his submissions (1), (2), (3) and (4). Mr Stewart then sought and obtained a continuation of the appeal so that he could consult with his client and take further instructions.'


The appeal was heard again on 18th February 1992 by the Lord Justice-Clerk, Lord McCluskey and Lord Kirkwood, when the Lord Justice-Clerk issued the following further note:

'In the appeal at the instance of Derek Fulton against the Procurator Fiscal, Edinburgh, at the hearing today Mr McGhie on behalf of the appellant recognised that when the case had called on 17th December 1991 it had been made plain by the court that argument would only be heard on behalf of the appellant on the fifth of the submissions which counsel then acting had outlined to the court. Today Mr McGhie, on behalf of the appellant, has intimated that what he would wish to argue would fall under paragraph (b of the grounds stated in the application for a stated case . . . and he went on to explain that the submission would be that on a proper construction of the terms of the Scottish Airports Byelaws 1986 it would be contended that section [sic] 5(14) did not, as matter of relevancy, cover taxis. We accordingly agreed to a further continuation of this case so that the hearing upon that matter can take place at a date to be afterwards fixed.'


The appeal was heard again on 9th July 1992 by the Lord Justice-Clerk, Lord Morison and Lord Grieve.

For the appellant: Bell, Q.C., instructed by McKay & Norwell, W.S.
For the respondent: Macdonald, Q.C., A.-D.

On 29th September 1992 the Lord Justice-Clerk delivered the following opinion of the court.

Lord Justice-Clerk.

On 11th April 1991 the appellant appeared in Edinburgh Sheriff Court in answer to a complaint which libelled a contravention of the Scottish Airports Byelaws 1986, section [sic] 5(14) and the Airports Act 1986, section 64. The complaint libelled: [His Lordship narrated the charge as set out above, and continued:]

A challenge to the competency of the complaint was made on behalf of the appellant, who adhered to his plea of not guilty. It was agreed by the appellant and the respondent that it would be appropriate that evidence should be led first by the respondent and that thereafter legal argument could be heard. In the event evidence was led for the respondent and further evidence was led for the appellant. The sheriff then heard submissions on behalf of the appellant and the respondent, including submissions on the plea to competency. The sheriff reserved judgment until 22nd April 1991 when she found the appellant guilty and admonished him. Against his conviction the appellant has now appealed by way of stated case.

At a previous diet, when the appeal called before the court, counsel intimated that he had five principal submissions to make. It was, however, conceded by counsel that with one exception his submissions were not covered by the matters sought to be brought under review in the application for the stated case. Counsel was unable to show cause as to why the appellant should be allowed to found any aspect of his appeal on a matter not contained in the application for a stated case and the court accordingly intimated that it was not prepared to hear argument on the appellant's behalf in respect of four of his five submissions. The appeal was continued to enable counsel to take instructions.

As a result of that decision of the court the only submission of the appellant which was covered by his application for a stated case was a submission that on a proper construction of the byelaws no offence under the byelaws was shown to have been committed on the facts of the case. Before the sheriff the submission had been that a prosecution in terms of byelaw 8(1) of the said Byelaws would have been incompetent as ultra vires in respect that the byelaw enacted by that section went beyond the enabling powers in the principal Act of Parliament and was also repugnant to the general law.

At the hearing of the appeal on 9th July 1992, Mr Bell for the appellant drew attention to the relevant findings in fact. The findings revealed that a Mr Powell on 30th January 1990 arrived at Edinburgh Airport. He required to transact business in Kirkcaldy and approached two taxi drivers in a queue of taxis seeking the quotation of a fare for the journey to Kirkcaldy. He regarded the quotations as excessive. He then noticed the appellant in his black hackney cab discharging a fare some yards behind the airport taxi rank queue in Jubilee Road. He approached the appellant and enquired the fare to Kirkcaldy. The appellant Stated that the fare would be £25, and Mr Powell agreed to that fare and entered the taxi.

Finding 29 is in the following terms:

'On 30th January 1990, the appellant was cautioned and charged that he had offered his taxi for hire without the permission of British Airports Authority and without other lawful authority or excuse, contrary to the Scottish Airports Byelaws 1986, section [sic] 5(14), and the Airports Act 1986, section 64.'

Mr Bell drew attention to the Scottish Airports Byelaws 1986 and pointed out that byelaw I dealt with interpretation. It was provided therein inter alia that 'the airport' means the 'aerodrome known as . . . Edinburgh Airport . . .'. Mr Bell pointed out that in the Oxford Dictionary aerodrome is defined as 'A course for the use of flying machines; a tract of level ground from which aeroplanes or airships can start'. He accordingly submitted that Edinburgh Airport did not include the roadway on which the appellant had been with his taxi at the airport. He submitted that it was clear that the roadway in question was outwith the curtilage of the aerodrome. We are satisfied that that contention is unsound. Section 63(1) of the Airports Act 1986 empowers the airport operator to make byelaws for regulating the use and operation of the airport and the conduct of all persons while within the airport. 'The airport' must, we think, include the landing ground, the terminal building and the curtilage. In any event finding 12 is in the following terms:

'Edinburgh Airport Ltd are the heritable proprietors of the lands on which Edinburgh Airport is situated, including Jubilee Road.'

It is, we think, clear from that finding that Jubilee Road is part of Edinburgh Airport and that it is incorrect to suggest that the roadway is outwith the curtilage of the airport.

Mr Bell next referred to byelaw 8(1). That byelaw provides as follows:

'No person shall cause or permit a taxi to ply for hire or load passengers other than at an authorised stance provided that it shall not be an offence to load passengers in a public car park or at a distance of more than half a mile from the nearest of such authorised stances or, with the consent of a constable or the Authority, at any distance from such authorised stances.'

Mr Bell stated that although the appellant had not been charged with any contravention of byelaw 8(1) he could have been charged with such an offence. He also drew attention to the provisions of byelaw 8(9) which is in the following terms:

'Taxi drivers shall not obstruct the road, footpath or buildings or cause annoyance or disturbance to persons in the vicinity.'

Mr Bell maintained that byelaws such as 8(1) and 8(9) were ultra vires. This was because of the provisions of section 63 of the Airports Act 1986. Section 63(1) empowers the airport operator to make byelaws for regulating the use and operation of the airport and the conduct of all persons while within the airport. In section 63(2) it is provided inter alia as follows:

'(2) Any such byelaws may, in particular, include byelaws—. . .

(d) for regulating vehicular traffic anywhere within the airport, except on roads within the airport to which the road traffic enactments apply, and in particular (with that exception) for imposing speed limits on vehicles within the airport and for restricting or regulating the parking of vehicles or their use for any purpose or in any manner specified in the byelaws.'

Section 63(3) provides as follows:

'In paragraph (d) of subsection (2) “the road traffic enactments” means the enactments (whether passed before or after this Act) relating to road traffic, including the lighting and parking of vehicles, and any order or other instrument having effect by virtue of any such enactment.'

Mr Bell submitted that the effect of section 63(2)(d) was that the British Airports Authority could not make byelaws for regulating traffic on roads to which the road traffic enactments applied. He submitted that Jubilee Road was plainly a road to which the road traffic enactments applied and that accordingly byelaws such as byelaw 8(1) and 8(9) were beyond the powers of the British Airports Authority.

The Crown's answer to this submission was, of course, that the appellant was not being charged with byelaw 8(1) or 8(9). What the appellant was being charged with contravening was byelaw 5(14). Byelaw 5 deals with 'acts for which permission is required'. It provides as follows:

'The following acts are prohibited unless the permission of the Authority has first been obtained or unless the act is performed by a person acting with lawful authority or excuse in circumstances in which the obtaining of permission would be likely to hinder that person in so acting: . . .

(14) No person shall sell or distribute anything, offer anything for sale or hire or make any offer of services.'

As we understand it, however, Mr Bell's submission was that on the findings the appellant had offered his taxi for hire on Jubilee Road and had thereby offered his services to Mr Powell. That being so, the submission appeared to be that the making of byelaw 5(14) was struck at by the provisions of section 63(2)(d) which provided in effect that byelaws could not be made for the purpose of regulating the use of vehicles for any purpose on roads within the airport to which the road traffic enactments applied.

The advocate-depute contended that the true effect of section 63(2)(d) was that on a road within the airport to which the road traffic enactments applied, the airport authority could not make byelaws which changed the road traffic enactments. He stressed, however, that the charge in this case libelled a contravention of byelaw 5(14), and he contended that that byelaw dealt with the offering for hire of articles, and that the fact that in this case the article was a vehicle was irrelevant. He founded on the findings which made it clear that at the material time the appellant was offering to hire his taxi to Mr Powell and was offering his services to Mr Powell. He submitted, under reference to section 63(2)(d), that the provisions 'restricting or regulating the parking of vehicles or their use for any purpose' were confined to restricting or regulating the use of vehicles in the context of the regulation of vehicular traffic; these provisions had no application to the use of vehicles except insofar as such use could be regarded as a facet of the regulating of vehicular traffic. So far as the use of vehicles for any other purpose was concerned, the provisions of section 63(2)(d) had no application.

We have come to the conclusion that in this respect the advocate-depute's submissions are sound. Although we agree that the effect of section 63(2)(d) is that the airport operator cannot make byelaws for regulating traffic on roads to which the road traffic enactments apply, this does not mean that byelaw 5(14) is in any way ultra vires. The sheriff recognised that Jubilee Road was a road to which the road traffic enactments applied, as evidence to that effect had been given by Inspector Elgin. She realised, however, that if the appellant's arguments were sound then, as regards hackney carriages in Jubilee Road, provisions such as section 63(2)(e) and (f) would be inapplicable. She concluded that that could not have been the intention of Parliament. In our opinion, the sheriff was well founded in accepting that section 63(2)(d) did not cover the use of vehicles for all purposes, but was concerned solely with the use of vehicles so far as regulating vehicular traffic was concerned. In the course of her note the sheriff referred to Cinnamond v British Airports Authority. In that case Lord Denning M.R. said of byelaws made by the British Airports Authority [at p.589F-G]:

'It seems to me that the approach nowadays should be different in regard to modern byelaws. If the byelaw is of such a nature that something of this kind is necessary or desirable for the operation of the airport, then the court should endeavour to interpret the byelaw so as to render it valid rather than invalid. The Latin maxim is Ut res magis valeat quam pereat—it is better for a thing to have effect than to be made void. If it is drafted in words which on a strict interpretation may be said to be too wide, or too uncertain, or to be unreasonable, then the court—so long as the words permit it—should discard the strict interpretation and interpret them with any reasonable implications or qualifications which may be necessary so as to produce a just and proper result.'

We agree that that is the correct approach and, adopting that approach, we agree with the sheriff that one should avoid an interpretation which would have the effect of making a number of safety provisions in section 63(2) inapplicable. It is, in our opinion, preferable and indeed a sound construction to read section 63(2)(d) as not extending to the use of vehicles for purposes which cannot be regarded as being in the context of regulating vehicular traffic. Accordingly, so far as roads within the airport to which the road traffic enactments apply are concerned, there is nothing to prevent the airport operator from making byelaws regulating the use of vehicles for any purposes which are not properly concerned with regulating vehicular traffic.

In our opinion byelaw 5(14) is not concerned with regulating vehicle traffic at all. It is expressed in general terms, and the words are apt to cover the present situation where the findings show that the appellant offered his taxi for hire to Mr Powell and offered his services to Mr Powell. The provisions in byelaw 5(14) to the effect that such offers were prohibited unless permission from the British Airports Authority had first been obtained, are not properly to be regarded as provisions regulating vehicular traffic. In other words, we are satisfied that the prohibition upon which the Crown rely in relation to the charge against the appellant has nothing to do with regulating vehicular traffic on Jubilee Road. Byelaw 5(14) deals with selling, distributing, offering for sale or hire, or offering services. The language used is clearly wide enough to cover motor vehicles, but where motor vehicles are concerned the prohibition cannot be regarded as being a provision for regulating vehicular traffic. It is also of significance that the Road Traffic Acts do not deal with the licensing and regulation of taxis regarding which provisions are to be found in the Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982.

For the foregoing reasons we are satisfied that the sheriff arrived at a correct decision in this case. She was well founded in rejecting the plea to competency and in convicting the appellant of the charge. On a proper construction of the byelaws, an offence under the byelaws was, on the facts found proved, shown to have been committed. We shall accordingly answer the one question in the case in the affirmative and the appeal is therefore refused.
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