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In case some people are wondering whether or not they have sufficient legal standing to bring about judicial review proceedings, I have taken the liberty to refresh ones memory what the requirement is for such standing.

Standing for judicial review

Judicial Review The requirement of sufficient interest.

In order to bring proceedings for judicial review, a person must have standing to do so. The court may not grant leave to apply for judicial review unless it considers that the applicant has a sufficient interest in the matter to which the application relates. The question whether the applicant has sufficient interest may arise at two stages. At the permission stage it is only in obvious cases that the court may decide that the applicant lacks sufficient interest. In most cases, however, the question of standing is determined on the substantive application for judicial review. Save in simple or clear cases the question whether the applicant has a sufficient interest should not be determined at the threshold stage as a preliminary issue independent of a full consideration of the merits of the complaint.

The grant of permission will not preclude the court itself from considering afresh, nor the opposite party from contending, that the applicant had no sufficient interest to maintain his application. Since the question whether a person has sufficient interest to bring the application goes to the jurisdiction of the court, that issue will have to be determined at the substantive hearing. The parties cannot agree to confer on the court jurisdiction which it does not have.

The question of what is a 'sufficient interest' in the matter to which the application relates appears to be a mixed question of fact and law; it is a question of fact and degree and the relationship between the applicant and the matter to which the application relates, having regard to all the circumstances of the case. Since 1982 the courts have adopted the same uniform rule of standing irrespective of the remedy for which the applicant has applied. In recent years the rules about standing have been considerably relaxed. It has been suggested that the key issue is whether the applicant can identify some substantial default or abuse and not whether his personal rights or interests are involved.

A number of cases have considered the standing of pressure groups to bring applications for judicial review. In general the courts have decided that such groups do have standing to challenge decisions which concern their areas of interest and expertise.In the case where a right of appeal to the courts against an administrative or judicial decision is conferred by a statutory provision, the right is frequently confined to a 'person aggrieved', or a person who claims to be or feels aggrieved. Locus standi to impugn administrative orders otherwise than by way of appeal is often similarly restricted.The meaning of a 'person aggrieved' may vary according to the context. However, as a matter of general principle, any person who has a decision decided against him (particularly in adversarial proceedings) will be a person aggrieved for the purposes of appealing against that decision unless the decision amounts to an acquittal of a purely criminal offence. Further, the fact that the decision against which the person wishes to appeal reverses a decision which was originally taken by that person does not prevent that person being a person aggrieved.

The width of the class of persons who have been held to qualify as persons aggrieved has varied over time. More recent authorities have taken a liberal approach to the interpretation of the phrase. In some contexts the expression has been interpreted to include persons objecting to a licensing application that has been granted18, and other persons who have a substantial grievance in respect of an order, proposal or decision prejudicially affecting their interests but not encroaching directly upon them. Earlier authorities suggested that a person will not be held to be 'aggrieved' by a decision if that decision is not materially adverse to him20 or if the tribunal to which he seeks to appeal has no jurisdiction to find in his favour. It was also suggested that it was not, in general, enough for a person to show that he is dissatisfied with the order made or that his interests are likely to be prejudiced by the outcome.

It was said that a person was normally required to establish that he had been denied or deprived of something to which he was legally entitled, or that the decision had imposed a legal burden on him, or that (as in the case of a licensing decision against which a right of appeal is provided by statute) the adverse impact of the decision on his interests was so direct that he must be regarded as falling within the statutory category of persons aggrieved by it. In recent cases, however, a more liberal interpretation has been adopted, consistent with the relaxation in the rules of standing applied in judicial review proceedings.

1 See the Supreme Court Act 1981 s 31(3).2 See para 161 post.3 IRC v National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd [1982] AC 617 at 642, [1981] 2 All ER 93 at 105, HL, per Lord Diplock (by rejecting an application at this stage the court can 'prevent abuse by busybodies, cranks and other mischief-makers': at 653 and 113 per Lord Scarman).

notes 7–10—If a claimant has insufficient private interest in bringing an application, provided he raises a genuine public interest, he will have standing: R (on the application of Feakins) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [2003] EWCA Civ 1546, [2004] 1 WLR 1761.note 7—A taxpayer does not have standing to bring an application against the taxing authorities in respect of the tax affairs of another unless he can demonstrate a peculiar interest in the impact of the decision: R (on the application of Freeserve.com plc) v Customs and Excise Comrs [2003] EWHC 2736 (Admin), [2004] STC 187 (company not assessed to value added tax; competitor did not have standing). Provided an individual is affected by the outcome of a consultation exercise, he should not be debarred from challenging any resulting decision because he has chosen not to participate in the consultation: R (on the application of Edwards) v Environment Agency [2004] EWHC 736 (Admin), [2004] 3 All ER 21.note 10—It is not, however, normally appropriate for a litigant, or his lawyers, to determine unilaterally that a case in which the claimant no longer requires substantive relief ought to proceed as a test case: R (on the application of Tshikangu) v Newham LBC [2001] All ER (D) 177 (Feb).note 22—SI 1992/1903 replaced in relation to England by the Town and Country Planning (Enforcement) (Inquiries Procedure) (England) Rules 2002, SI 2002/2686. See also the Town and Country Planning Appeals (Determination by Inspectors) (Inquiries Procedure) (Wales) Rules 2003, 2003/1267, r 11.note 25—See R (on the application of North Cyprus Tourism Centre Ltd) v Transport for London [2005] EWHC 1698 (Admin), [2005] All ER (D) 446 (Jul) (party prevented from advertising on public transport on grounds of public policy had standing).