Taxi Driver Online

The full text of that case is on here somewhere. The case sited in this particular instance was Dittah v Birmingham City Council [1993] RTR 356.

In that case the appellants held operator's licences issued by Birmingham City Council. but had used vehicles and drivers licensed by adjoining authorities. The appellants argued that on a proper constriction of the statutory provisions, it was only necessary for the vehicles and drivers to be licensed by an appropriate authority for an operator to be entitled to operate them.

The court rejected that argument. It held that the effect of section 80(2) as applied to section 46(1) (e) is to require the operator only to operate vehicles and drivers licensed by the authority which granted him the operator's licence. In his judgement, with which Clarke J (as he then was) agreed. Kennedy LJ stated that the law was accurately set out in the following passage from a letter of the Department of Transport to the District Secretary of Bromsgrove District Council of 25th June 1992:

"In our view applying section 80(2) to sections 46(1)(d) and (e) has the effect that an operator requires a licence from the area in which he intends to operate and may operate only in that area vehicles and drivers licensed by the same district. This has the practical effect that an operator licensed in area A may only use vehicles and drivers licensed in area A but these vehicles and drivers will by virtue of section 75(2) exemption be able to go anywhere in the course of the hiring".

The encapsulated reasoning in the Shanks case is as follows.

The argument which Miss Booth puts before us, which, she submits. was not part of the argument before the court in Dittah and which should persuade us to come to a different conclusion, is that, firstly, we should remember in approaching the proper construction of the section that it is a section creating a criminal offence. Accordingly, we should construe it in a way which is beneficial to people in the position of her client if there is any ambiguity in the meaning of any part of those statutory provisions.

17. Secondly, she submits that in relation to section 46(1)(e) where reference is made to "the said section 48" and the said section 51", those phrases are intended to emphasise the fact that what is required is simply a licence granted under those sections by whatever authority and, accordingly, there is no room for the provisions of section 80(2) to impose any different or other meaning upon those phrases. Miss Booth submits that that result explains why it is that in section 75(2) no specific exemption is necessary for operators because the use of vehicles licensed by another authority does not in any event create an offence. Her simple submission is that provided that the operator uses vehicles and drivers which are licensed by any authority then that accords with the proper meaning of the phrases in section 46(1)(e).

18. She submits that on a proper consideration of the way in which the arguments were presented to the court in the case of Dittah, it is apparent that this did not form part of the arguments of the appellants in that case and that it was essentially assumed by the court that there was no issue but that if section 80(2) applied to section 46(1) (e) then the meaning must have been as was stated by the court and as I have already indicated.

19. It seems to me that that argument is impossible to sustain. The question which was considered by the court in the Dittah case was as follows:

"'whether section 46(1)(e) of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 must be read subject to the provisions of section 80(2) of that Act so as to require private hire operators licensed under section 55 of the Act to make use only of vehicles and drivers licensed by the council of the district by which the operators are licensed, or whether section 75(2) of the Act, read in conjunction with section 80, allows operators to use or to employ drivers and vehicles licensed by a district council other than that in which the operator is licensed.'"

20. It seems to me inevitable that the court in considering that question was bound to have considered the effect of section 80(2) on the provisions of section 46(1)(e) as a matter of substance and not as a matter of concession. Indeed, when dealing with the arguments of the parties, it seems to me that Kennedy LJ made it plain that that was the way in which the court was approaching the matter. When dealing with the defendant’s case he said at page 362G:

"Mr Massey submits that whilst section 46(1)(e) is not specifically saved by section 75(2) the wording of section 75(2) was to avoid multiple applications for vehicle and driver licences. There was, therefore, no need to repeat the saving provisions of section 75(2) in relation to the second and third paragraphs of section 46(1) (e). The exclusion, submits Mr Massey, follows as a matter of logic. That I cannot accept. In my judgment if section 75(2) was intended to apply to section 46(1)(e) it would say so. In fact it is my view that the only obvious reasons for having the words 'in a controlled district' in section 46(1)(e) is to bring that subsection, to which section 75(2) is not applied, within the scope of section 80(2)."

21. I can see nothing to suggest that in dealing with the matter as he did. Kennedy LJ was in any way treating the question of what the proper meaning of section 46-(1) (e) in the context of section 80 (2) would be as a matter of agreement between the parties. It seems to me that in those circumstances it is impossible for this court to come to any other conclusion but that the decision of this court in the case of Dittah is one which was not reached per incuriam in the sense that I have explained.

22. Not only do I consider that it has not been shown that the decision of Dittah was per incuriam and, therefore, a case which we can re-visit, but I have come to the firm conclusion that it was correctly decided. The provisions of section 80(2) as applied to section 46(1)(e), in my judgment, brook of no other answer but that the operator granted the licence under section 55 can only operate vehicles and drivers licensed by the licensing authority which granted it its operator's licence. One way of testing whether or not that particular construction is correct is to consider the consequences of the construction contended for by Miss Booth. One of the consequences would be that if one applied her logic to section 46(1)(d) and (e), the only conclusion that one could come to would be that an operator could operate in any district provided he had obtained a licence authorising him to operate in one district.

23. That would, in my judgment, drive a coach and horses through what appears to me to be a central principle of this legislation, which is that the authorities responsible for granting licences should have the ability to exercise full control over the operation of private hire vehicles within their area.

24. I consider therefore that there are good policy reasons for ensuring that there is a unified system of control in relation to private hire vehicles operating within the area of any given authority. That ensures consistency of policy in relation to the provision of private hire vehicles and their drivers. It enables the authority to ensure that it is able to exercise such control as it is entitled to exercise over all the vehicles and drivers being operated to provide private hire services within its area. That seems to me to be a central purpose of the statutory provisions.

25. There is no doubt that there are advantages operationally and in the provision of a service to the public to be gained from a more flexible form of control. Accordingly. therefore there may well be good policy reasons for re-visiting the structure which has been created by the 1986 action. In particular, there has been a significant development in modern communication systems which may make the demarcations, which are consequent upon the construction of the Act, which I consider to be correct, too restrictive in the public interest. But that is not a matter for this court. That is a matter for Parliament. It is to be noted that although there are obvious restrictions

which apply as a result of the construction which I have accepted of the Act, nonetheless there is a considerable amount of flexibility even within the structure as properly construed, as pointed out by Mr McGuinness.

26. The meaning of `operator" in section 80 when taken in conjunction with section 75(2) provides for considerable flexibility. The operator can use the vehicles within his organisation for journeys both inside and outside the area of the local authority in which he is licensed and, indeed, can use such vehicles and drivers for journeys which have ultimately no connection with the area in which they are licensed. There is, it seems to me, therefore. no reason to believe that the construction, which I consider to be the right construction of the Act, renders the operation of private hire vehicles in any way so restrictive as to justify the conclusion that the construction that I have reached must be wrong.

27. There was before the magistrates a consequential question arising out of the primary question as to the extent to which the sub-contracting of work was permissible, it seems to me, and I think it is agreed by both counsel, that the answer to the proper meaning of section 46(1)(e) effectively answers that question. It is clear that whenever any operator acts by making provision for the invitation or acceptance of bookings for a private hire vehicle, he must use vehicles and drivers licensed by his licensing authority. He is perfectly entitled to do that by way of sub-contract: but he cannot obtain the use of vehicles or drivers licensed by another authority in order to carry out the booking which he has as an operator made provision for by way of invitation or acceptance.

28. In those circumstances. I consider that the justices came to a correct conclusion of law and that each of the four questions which they have posed should be answered in the affirmative. END.

I think that sums up the situation in respect of current legislation.

It would appear that if the law was to be changed then it might well be changed in favour of perhaps one central office managing vehicles licensed in several authorities. Any new legislation is likely to take a step forward rather than a step backwards.

I don't think those authorities such as Liverpool who are advocating that private hire vehicles return to their base after dropping off passengers outside their area have much chance of convincing the Government to legislate on those terms.

Regards

JD

Hi. Apparently, Auriga can do this. There is a firm in Scotland (all one firm) where some drivers only work a certain part of the town, other drivers only work another part of town, and the rest work either.

That's the way it happens up here just now - you can pick up and drop in another area but can't hang around in that area waiting for work.

But at the moment I don't think theres anything to stop an office using cars from different areas if only because there's no base station licensing, but using cars in the "wrong" area regularly to get round knowledge or age rules woudln't work because of the above rule.

if they can do it they best hurry up.
the council are taking them to court.
but i would like to see how auriga get around statutes though.