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This might raise a few eyebrows?
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Warriner v York City Council
Queen's Bench Division (Crown Office List)
HEARING-DATES: 6 May 1992
COUNSEL:
D Zucker for the Appellant; D McGonigal for the Respondent
PANEL: MacPherson J
JUDGMENTBY-1: MACPHERSON J
JUDGMENT-1:
MACPHERSON J: This is a case stated by justices for the county of North Yorkshire. On 1st August 1990 a complaint was preferred by the appellant, whose name is DJ Warriner, against the respondent, the York City Council, in that on 31st July 1990 the Council refused to renew a Hackney Carriage Proprietor's Licence which expired on 31st May 1990.
The facts found by the magistrates are very simple and straightforward. I recite them. The appellant had passed his driving test in 1956. He had only one motoring conviction for speeding while driving a heavy goods vehicle in 1980. He had for some time held a hackney carriage driver's licence -- I stress the word "driver's" -- and had worked for three different proprietors. It was accepted by the Council that his ability to drive a hackney carriage was not open to question. I stress that word "driver's" because it is apparent to all that there are two sorts of licence with which the court is concerned, first, a driver's licence, which is one thing, and, secondly, a hackney carriage vehicle licence, which is a wholly separate thing.
As to that, the position was that the appellant had worked for a Mrs Stead who held three such vehicle licences up to the date of her death in February 1990. The executors transferred licence No 64, one of those licences, and the Council duly registered the transfer of the licence, pursuant to the law, to the appellant. But the time then came when the licence had to be renewed, because such licences are annual and have to be renewed each year.
The appellant was written to by the Council indicating that the licence would not be renewed in his name because the Council had a policy of allocating plates, that is to say granting hackney carriage vehicle licences, to the next person on the waiting list who wanted one. They are of course valuable things because the Council has to ration the number of plates in accordance with the Act and in accordance with the provisions in respect of unmet demand, to which I have been referred.
The position was that the county had formulated a policy of such allocation in turn in order to have a fair system of allotment. The Council had as a matter of history deemed that 150 carriage proprietor's licences should be issued and 160 hackney carriage driver's licences in their own jurisdiction. There were in fact 234 people on the waiting list, 17 of whom had been there for more than ten years. The court was referred to the relevant minutes of the committee and subcommittees of the Council in respect of the making of the policy in accordance with the democratic process. The Council refused to renew the hackney carriage proprietor's licence and said why they did so in a letter dated 18th June.
Two points arise in this case, but before dealing with that I deal with some general matters as to which there is no dispute. As I have already indicated, the licence is granted to a carriage and not to its owner. Provided a vehicle continues to meet the licensing condition of fitness imposed by the Council, the appellant says that there is no ground upon which the Council could revoke or refuse to renew the licence at the end of the licensing period.
There are two questions which arise. The first argument raised by the appellant is that the relevant section limits the grounds of refusal under section 61(c) to grounds which are ejusdem generis, that is to say of the same genus as the other grounds set out in either (a) or (b) or both.
Mr Zucker looks at the section and attempts to make good that argument. The section reads as follows:
"60(1) Notwithstanding anything in the Act of 1847 or in this Part of this Act, a district council may suspend or revoke, or (on application therefor under section 40 of the Act of 1847 or section 48 of this Act, as the case may be) refuse to renew a vehicle licence on any of the following grounds:-
(a) that the hackney carriage or private hire vehicle is unfit for use as a hackney carriage or private hire vehicle;
(b) any offence under, or non-compliance with, the provisions of the Act of 1847 or of this Part of this Act by the operator or driver; or
(c) any other reasonable cause."
Mr Zucker accepts that subsection (1)(a), which has only one species, namely the unfitness for use as a hackney carriage, does not itself create a genus. He says that since there is more than one species of matter dealt with in subsection (1)(b) there is there the possibility of a genus to which subsection 1(c) could be applied. Furthermore, he argues that the word "or" after subsection (1)(b) supports the contention that section (1)(c) is to be read together with section (1)(b).
The ejusdem generis rule, otherwise known as Lord Tenterden's rule, can be stated as follows. I read from Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, fifth edition, volume 3 at page 1799:
"Where a statute, or other document, enumerates several classes of persons or things, and immediately following and classed with such enumeration the clause embraces 'other' persons or things -- the word 'other' will generally be read as 'other such like,' so that the persons or things therein comprised may be read as ejusdem generis with, and not of a quality superior to, or different from, those specifically enumerated."
There are many examples given in Stroud, and I cite simply one at page 1800 for example:
"(vi) So, the words 'or other agent' . . . had to be read as ejusdem generis with 'banker, merchant, broker, attorney,' with which they were there associated . . .".
Similarly, and this was the example cited by Mr McGonigal, an act which enacted that no tradesman, artificer, workman, labourer or other person whatsoever should exercise his ordinary calling on the Lord's day did not include in the phrase, "or other person whatsoever", an attorney or a solicitor, or a stagecoachman. What the law envisaged was only perhaps that those who work literally with their hands should be governed by the relevant section. That is the principle which applies.
Mr McGonigal in his argument indicates that there is no particular class of persons or things being described either in (a) or (b) and no common feature or genus. He says that section 61 simply sets out three separate grounds on which a District Council can suspend, revoke or refuse to renew a vehicle licence. In my judgment, Mr McGonigal's argument prevails. It seems to me plain, looking at the section, that Parliament had decided that they would list two specific and clear instances where a local authority might refuse to renew, namely where a vehicle was unfit or where a person had been involved with a breach of the law in respect of hackney carriages. That is because the Act of 1847 was an Act which set out various matters governing those who use hackney carriages. For example, plying for hire illegally is an offence against one of the sections of the 1847 Act. It seems to me that any other reasonable cause is distinct and separate and specifically so from the matters set out in (a) and (b). That then disposes of the ejusdem generis argument.
Mr Zucker, however, goes on to say that in his submission a policy, such as I have described, is not a cause within the meaning of section 61(c). He says that ground and cause are differently defined in dictionaries, and he says that "any other reasonable cause" cannot embrace a policy as set out by the Council in this case.
In the case of Cook v Southend Borough Council there was a policy considered by the Court of Appeal. It was of course a completely different policy from the one with which I am concerned, but the court indicated that a policy could be a matter coming within the relevant subsection. It seems to me that in the present case there is no reason why the Council should not use section 61(c) to implement the policy which has ruled for many years. There are no words in subsection (c) limiting the nature of reasonable causes which may give rise to a district council's refusal to renew a vehicle licence, and indeed the use of the word "any" as Mr McGonigal submits suggests an unrestricted range of reasonable causes. Parliament gave wide powers to district councils, and this district council has decided that it is right and fair, particularly fair, that they should adopt the policy of following the names on the list in order that others should not be able to jump the queue by getting their hands on the vehicle and then compelling the local authority to transfer or to renew the licence in their name.
It is suggested that the court is not being asked to determine whether the policy in this case was reasonable, but it seems to me right that I should look at that aspect of the case. It seems to me that it cannot fairly be argued that the policy is unreasonable. If it is fair, prima facie, it is reasonable. It seems to me that it is evidently fair, in circumstances where these licences are valuable and much in demand, that a sensible policy of queuing for them should be adopted. In so far as I am allowed to say so, it seems to me that the policy which was adopted by this local Council was in itself reasonable.
The actual question asked by the magistrates for the opinion of the High Court is:
"Does section 60(1)(c) limit the grounds of refusal to matters ejusdem generis with the other grounds set out in (a) and (b) or does that section give the Council wider powers of refusal so as to give effect to any policy that they may have?"
The answer to the question will be apparent from the judgment which I have already given. In my judgment, it certainly allows the Council to give effect to any reasonable policy that they may have adopted.
The appeal is therefore dismissed in accordance with the answer to the question which I have given.
DISPOSITION:
Appeal dismissed
SOLICITORS:
Mitchells, York; R Clark, Head of Legal Services
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