the case of Bygraves v Dicker [1923] 2 KB 585. That was concerned with the question of whether or not the registered proprietor of a Hackney carriage was vicariously responsible for whatever it was the driver of the carriage did. In that case the driver had injured somebody on returning from the races at Brighton and the proprietor had been sued at common law for damages. It was submitted on behalf of the plaintiff that as the defendant was the registered proprietor of the car and the driver the licensed driver, a presumption arose under the 1847 Act that the relationship of master and servant existed between the defendant proprietor and the driver, and that the proprietor was responsible for the acts of the latter in driving the car.
In interpreting the 1847 Act on the appeal from the County Court, the Divisional Court did rely upon the construction of the London Hackney Carriages Act, 1843, as that had been interpreted in the courts. The 1843 Act had clearly been interpreted so as to show that the proprietor was vicariously responsible for the acts of the driver.
At page 592 of the report, Lush J said this in his judgment: "The Courts having interpreted the Act of 1843 as meaning that the driver of a Hackney carriage is to be treated as the servant of the registered proprietor, it cannot consistently be said that a different conclusion should be arrived at as to the meaning of the similar provisions of the Act of 1847. Where a certain construction has been placed upon one Act, it follows that, in the absence of any reason to the contrary, the same construction must apply to a later Act passed in pari materia with the former.
On the true construction of the Act of 1847, the licensed driver of a cab to which the Act applies must, therefore, be treated as if he were the servant of the registered proprietor, and a person who has been injured by the negligence of the driver may at his election sue either the driver's real master, or his statutable master, the registered proprietor of the cab."
What Mr Grigson submits to us is that in the same way as the 1843 Act in that case influenced the interpretation of the 1847 Act, so the definition of proprietor in the early Act should apply to the later Act and so to the present case. That submission seems to be founded in good sense and in good law and I, for my part, would say that the extended definition as put forward by Mr Grigson is one that we should apply for the purposes of this appeal.
viewtopic.php?f=13&t=4089
Login
Register
FAQ
