Taxi Driver Online

The most widely used excuse for running a business of hire or reward without a license, is one of social kindness. This is the excuse offered by the chap was recently prosecuted for running a pet service who used the excuse that he only carried the person paying the fare, if they so requested? However the law is pretty much settled on what constitutes a social kindness and here is one such case that help settle that law.
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[DIVISIONAL COURT]

DREW v. DINGLE.

1933 Nov. 2.

LORD HEWART C.J., AVORY, and LAWRENCE JJ.

Road Traffic - Public Service Vehicle - Express Carriage - Carrying Passengers for Hire or Reward - "Separate fares" - Motor-lorry used to carry Passengers with their Goods - Market Produce - Inclusive Charge for Passenger and his Goods - Road Traffic Act, 1930 (20 & 21 Geo. 5, c. 43), s. 61, sub-s. 1 (b); s. 67; s. 72.

The respondent was charged with using a motor vehicle as an express carriage, without holding a public service vehicle licence or a road service licence. He was using his motor-lorry to carry passengers with their market produce to the market. He made an inclusive charge for the conveyance of each passenger and his goods:-

Held, that as the fares were paid separately by each passenger, it was immaterial that the passengers also carried some market produce with them. The respondent's motor-lorry was used as an express carriage within s. 61, sub-s. 1 (b), of the Road Traffic Act, 1930, which describes express carriages as motor vehicles carrying passengers for hire or reward at separate fares.

CASE stated by justices of Saltash, Cornwall.

Two complaints were preferred by the appellant, Police Superintendent James Henry Drew, against the respondent, Ernest Dingle, charging him (1.) with having on December 31, 1932, unlawfully used a motor vehicle as an express carriage, not being the holder of a public service vehicle licence to use it as a vehicle of that class, contrary to s. 67 of the Road Traffic Act, 1930 (20 & 21 Geo. 5, c. 43); and (2.) with using the same vehicle on the same occasion as an express carriage, not being the holder of a road service licence to use it as a vehicle of that class, contrary to s. 72 of the same Act. (1)

The following facts were proved or admitted: that on December 31, 1932, the respondent was driving his motor-lorry at Saltash, Cornwall, when he was stopped by a police constable.

(1) By the Road Traffic Act, 1930, s. 61: "(1.) Public service vehicles shall, for the purposes of this Part of this Act and the regulations made thereunder, he divided into the following classes:-
. . . . . . . .
(b) Express carriages; that is to say, motor vehicles carrying passengers for hire or reward at separate fares (none of which is less than one shilling for a single journey or such greater sum as may be prescribed) and for a journey or journeys from one or more points specified in advance to one or more common destinations so specified, and not stopping to take up or set down passengers other than those paying the appropriate fares for the journey or journeys in question."

He was then carrying in the lorry a quantity of market produce and five passengers, who were the owners of some of the market produce, and were accompanying their produce to the market. Two of the passengers, both of Stoke Climsland, paid the respondent 10s. for the conveyance of their produce and themselves from Stoke Climsland to Saltash; two others paid him 7s. each for the conveyance of their produce and themselves; and the fifth 5s. 3d. for the conveyance of his produce and himself from Callington to Saltash. The respondent had neither a public service vehicle licence nor a road service licence for the lorry. The appellant contended that the vehicle was being used as an express carriage within the meaning of s. 61, sub-s. 1 (b), of the Road Traffic Act, 1930, and that the respondent should have both a road service licence and a public service vehicle licence in respect of the lorry.

The respondent contended (1.) that the lorry was adapted to carry less than eight passengers, and was used on a special occasion; and (2.) that no separate fares were charged for the passengers. The charge was made in respect of the carriage of the produce to market, and would have been the same if the passengers had not been carried.

The justices were of opinion, in so far as it was a question of fact, that the payment of one sum to cover the conveyance of both the passengers and their goods did not constitute the conveyance of passengers at separate fares within the meaning of s. 61 of the Road Traffic Act, 1930, and that no separate fares were charged in respect of the passengers, and that the lorry was a vehicle ordinarily used for the purposes of agricultural

By s. 67: "(1.) No person shall cause or permit a motor vehicle to be used on any road as .... an express carriage .... unless he is the holder of a licence (in this Act referred to as 'a public service vehicle licence') to use it as a vehicle of that class. ....
. . . . . . . .
(3.) If any person causes or permits a vehicle to be used in contravention of this section, he shall be guilty of an offence."

By s. 72: "(1.) Subject to the provisions of this section the commissioners may grant to any person applying therefor a licence (in this Act referred to as a 'road service licence') to provide such a road service as may be specified therein, and a vehicle shall not be used as .... an express carriage except under such a licence." trade and not adapted for carrying eight or more passengers. The justices came to the conclusion that the motor-lorry could not be described as a public service vehicle or an express carriage, and they accordingly dismissed the informations.

The complainant appealed.

Wilfrid Lewis for the appellant. The respondent was carrying in the motor-lorry a quantity of market produce and five passengers, who were the owners of some of the produce, and were accompanying their produce to the market. A market is not a special occasion within the meaning of the proviso to sub-s. 1 of s. 61 of the Road Traffic Act, 1930: see Miller v. Pill. (1) The justices having found as a fact that a payment was made in respect of the carriage of a passenger, it is immaterial that that payment included a charge for the carriage of his goods. A fare was in fact charged in respect of each passenger. The respondent's vehicle was used to carry passengers for hire or reward at separate fares and was therefore used as an express carriage within the meaning of s. 61, sub-s. 1 (b), of the Road Traffic Act, 1930.

Dingle Foot for the respondent. The justices were justified in dismissing the summons, because there was no evidence before them that the respondent's motor-lorry was an express carriage. Nothing can be called an express carriage unless it strictly complies with proviso (b) of sub-s. 1 of s. 61 of the Road Traffic Act, 1930. The motor-lorry in this case does not comply with that proviso. The expression "appropriate fares" as used in that proviso must mean uniform fares, and must be something different from the fares which are paid in stage carriages. There is no evidence that a uniform or appropriate fare was paid in this case. The main purpose of the journey in question was the carriage of market produce to the market, and the carriage of the passengers was merely ancillary. The charge was made for the carriage of the produce to market. There was no additional charge for carrying the passengers.

LORD HEWART C.J. It is clear that this appeal ought to be allowed. The appellant's contention is that the motor vehicle referred to was being used as an express carriage within the meaning of s. 61, sub-s. 1 (b), of the Act of 1930. (1) I think that is so. Much has been said by Mr. Foot on the question of separate fares, but it seems to me that the evidence is all one way. The fares were paid separately by the passengers, and it is immaterial that those passengers also carried some market produce with them. It is clear on the facts that this vehicle satisfies all the requirements of an express carriage, and there were two offences committed. First, there was no public service licence, and, secondly, no road service licence.

I think, therefore, that the case ought to go back to the justices with a direction that the offences charged have been proved.

AVORY J. I am of the same opinion. It is difficult to tell what was in the minds of the justices when they said by their opinion that this lorry was a vehicle ordinarily used for the purpose of agriculture, trade or business, and not adapted to carrying eight or more passengers. I am satisfied that they were wrong in their opinion that the conveyance of passengers and their goods did not constitute the conveyance of passengers at separate fares.

The passengers were being carried for hire or reward within s. 61, sub-s. 1 (b), and the only question really before the justices was whether they were being carried for hire or reward at separate fares. On the facts found it is clear that they had paid separate fares for being carried, and in my opinion it is immaterial that they were carrying with them either something in the nature of luggage or market produce. I think this case ought to be sent back to the justices with the direction of this Court that the offence has been proved.

LAWRENCE J. I think the construction to be placed on the words "separate fares" becomes fairly clear by the contrast between sub-s. 1 and sub-s. 2 of s. 61 of the Road Traffic Act, 1930. Sub-s. 1, in paras. (a) and (b), deals with the contract for carrying passengers at separate fares, and in para. (c) for the use of the carriage as a whole. When the words used in sub-s. 1 are contrasted with those used in sub-s.

2, in reference to separate payments made by persons, it is clear that the words mean "separate" as between various passengers. I agree, therefore, that the appeal should be allowed.

Appeal allowed.

Solicitor for the appellant: The Treasury Solicitor.
Solicitors for the respondent: Foot, Bowden & Blight, Plymouth.
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